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Abstract. We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite
directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those
reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equi-
librium (NE) and a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). But sometimes
several equilibria may coexist such that in one equilibrium no player
reaches his target set whereas in another one several players reach it. It
is thus very natural to identify “relevant” equilibria. In this paper, we
consider different notions of relevant equilibria including Pareto optimal
equilibria and equilibria with high social welfare. We provide complexity
results for various related decision problems.
Keywords: multiplayer non-zero-sum games played on graphs · reach-
ability objectives · relevant equilibria · social welfare · Pareto optimality
1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum games played on graphs are commonly used to model reac-
tive systems where a system interacts with its environment [16]. In such setting
the system wants to achieve a goal - to respect a certain property - and the envi-
ronment acts in an antagonistic way. The underlying game is defined as follows:
the two players are the system and the environment, the vertices of the graph
are all the possible configurations in which the system can be and an infinite
path in this graph depicts a possible sequence of interactions between the system
and its environment. In such a game, each player chooses a strategy: it is the
way he plays given some information about the game and past actions of the
other player. Following a strategy for each player results in a play in the game.
Finding how the system can ensure that a given property is satisfied amounts
to find, if it exists, a winning strategy for the system in this game. For some
situations, this kind of model is too restrictive and a setting with more than two
agents such that each of them has his own not necessarily antagonistic objective
is more realistic. These games are called multiplayer non zero-sum games. In
⋆ Research partially supported by the PDR project “Subgame perfection in graph
games” (F.R.S.-FNRS) and by COST Action 16228 “GAMENET” (European Co-
operation in Science and Technology).
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this setting, the solution concept of winning strategy is not suitable anymore
and different notions of equilibria can be studied.
In this paper, we focus on Nash equilibrium (NE) [14]: given a strategy for
each player, no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from his strategy.
We also consider the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) well suited
for games played on graphs [15]. We study these two notions of equilibria on
reachability games. In reachability games, we equip each player with a subset of
vertices of the graph game that he wants to reach. We are interested in both the
qualitative and quantitative settings. In the qualitative setting, each player only
aims at reaching his target set, unlike the quantitative setting where each player
wants to reach his target set as soon as possible.
It is well known that both NEs and SPEs exist in both qualitative and quan-
titative reachability games. But, equilibria such that no player reaches his target
set and equilibria such that some players reach it may coexist. This observation
has already been made in [19,18]. In such a situation, one could prefer the second
situation to the first one. In this paper, we study different versions of relevant
equilibria.
Contributions For quantitative reachability games, we focus on the following
three kinds of relevant equilibria: constrained equilibria, equilibria optimizing
social welfare and Pareto optimal equilibria. For constrained equilibria, we aim
at minimizing the cost of each player i.e., the number of steps it takes to reach
his target set (Problem 1). For equilibria optimizing social welfare, a player does
not only want to minimize his own cost, he is also committed to maximizing the
social welfare (Problem 2). For Pareto optimal equilibria, we want to decide if
there exists an equilibrium such that the tuple of the costs obtained by players
following this equilibrium is Pareto optimal in the set of all the possible costs that
players can obtain in the game (Problem 3). We consider the decision variant of
Problems 1 and 2; and the qualitative adaptations of the three problems.
Our main contributions are the following.(i) We study the complexity of the
three decision problems. Our results gathered with previous works are summa-
rized in Table 1.(ii) We characterize a sufficient finite-memory to solve the three
decision problems. Our results and others from previous works are given in Ta-
ble 1.(iii) We identify a subclass of reachability games in which there always
exists an SPE where each player reaches his target set.(iv) Given a play, we
provide a characterization which guarantees that this play is the outcome of an
NE. This characterization is based on the values in the associated two-player
zero-sum games called coalitional games.
Related work There are many results on NEs and SPEs played on graphs, we
refer the reader to [9] for a survey and an extended bibliography. We here focus
on the results directly related to our contributions.
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Table 1. Complexity classes and memory results
Complexity
Qual. Reach. Quant. Reach.
NE SPE NE SPE
Prob. 1 NP-c [10] PSPACE-c[4] NP-c PSPACE-c[6]
Prob. 2 NP-c PSPACE-c NP-c PSPACE-c
Prob. 3 NP-h/ΣP2 PSPACE-c NP-h/Σ
P
2 PSPACE-c
Memory
Qual. Reach. Quant. Reach.
NE SPE NE SPE
Prob. 1 Poly.[10] Expo.[4] Poly. Expo.
Prob. 2 Poly. Expo. Poly. Expo.
Prob. 3 Poly. Expo. Poly. Expo.
Regarding Problem 1, for NEs, it is shown NP-complete only in the qualita-
tive setting [10]; for SPEs it is shown PSPACE-complete in both the qualitative
and quantitative settings in [4,6,5]. Notice that in [19], variants of Problem 1
for games with Streett, parity or co-Bu¨chi winning conditions are shown NP-
complete and decidable in polynomial time for Bu¨chi.
Regarding Problem 2, in the setting of games played on matrices, deciding
the existence of an NE such that the expected social welfare is at most k is
NP-hard [11]. Moreover, in [1] it is shown that deciding the existence of an NE
which maximizes the social welfare is undecidable in concurrent games in which
a cost profile is associated only with terminal nodes.
Regarding Problem 3, in the setting of zero-sum two-player multidimensional
mean-payoff games, the Pareto-curve (the set of maximal thresholds that a player
can force) is studied in [2] by giving some properties on the geometry of this set.
The autors provide a ΣP2 algorithm to decide if this set intersects a convex set
defined by linear inequations.
Regarding the memory, in [7] it is shown that there always exists an NE
with memory at most |V |+ |Π | in quantitative reachability games, without any
constraint on the cost of the NE. It is shown in [18] that, in multiplayer games
with ω-regular objectives, there exists an SPE with a given payoff if and only
if there exists an SPE with the same payoff but with finite memory. Moreover,
in [4] it is claimed that it is sufficient to consider strategies with an exponential
memory to solve Problem 1 for SPE in qualitative reachability games.
Finally, we can find several kinds of outcome characterizations for Nash equi-
libria and variants, e.g., in multiplayer games equipped with prefix-linear cost
functions and such that the vertices in coalitional games have a value (sum-
marized in [9]), in multiplayer games with prefix-independent Borel objectives
[19], in multiplayer games with classical ω-regular objectives (as reachability) by
checking if there exists a play which satisfies an LTL formula [10], in concurrent
games [12], etc. Such characterizations are less widespread for subgame perfect
equilibria, but one can recover one for quantitative reachability games thanks to
a value-iteration procedure [6].
Structure of the paper Due to the lack of space, we decide to only detail re-
sults for quantitative reachability games while results for qualitative reachability
games are only summarized in Table 1. In Section 2, we introduce the needed
background and define the different studied problems. In Section 3, we identify
families of reachability games for which there always exists a relevant equilib-
rium, for different notions of relevant equilibrium. In Section 4, we provide the
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main ideas necessary to obtain our complexity results (see Table 1). The detailed
proofs for the quantitative reachability setting, together with additional results
on qualitative reachability games are provided in the appendices.
2 Preliminaries and studied problems
Arena, game and strategies An arena is a tuple A = (Π,V,E, (Vi)i∈Π)
such that: (i) Π is a finite set of players; (ii) V is a finite set of vertices; (iii)
E ⊆ V ×V is a set of edges such that for all v ∈ V there exists v′ ∈ V such that
(v, v′) ∈ E and (iv) (Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V between the players.
A play in A is an infinite sequence of vertices ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . such that for all
k ∈ N, (ρk, ρk+1) ∈ E. A history is a finite sequence h = h0h1 . . . hk with k ∈ N
defined similarly. The length |h| of h is the number k of its edges. We denote the
set of plays by Plays and the set of histories by Hist. Moreover, the set Histi is
the set of histories such that their last vertex v is a vertex of player i, i.e. v ∈ Vi.
Given a play ρ ∈ Plays and k ∈ N, the prefix ρ0ρ1 . . . ρk of ρ is denoted by
ρ≤k and its suffix ρkρk+1 . . . by ρ≥k. A play ρ is called a lasso if it is of the
form ρ = hℓω with hℓ ∈ Hist. Notice that ℓ is not necessarily a simple cycle. The
length of a lasso hℓω is the length of hℓ.
A game G = (A, (Costi)i∈Π) is an arena equipped with a cost function profile
(Costi)i∈Π such that for all i ∈ Π , Costi : Plays→ N∪ {+∞} is a cost function
which assigns a cost to each play ρ for player i. We also say that the play ρ has
cost profile (Costi(ρ))i∈Π . Given two cost profiles c, c
′ ∈ (N∪ {+∞})|Π|, we say
that c ≤ c′ if and only if for all i ∈ Π , ci ≤ c′i.
An initial vertex v0 ∈ V is often fixed, and we call (G, v0) an initialized game.
A play (resp. a history) of (G, v0) is then a play (resp. a history) of G starting in
v0. The set of such plays (resp. histories) is denoted by Plays(v0) (resp. Hist(v0)).
The notation Histi(v0) is used when these histories end in a vertex v ∈ Vi.
Given a game G, a strategy for player i is a function σi : Histi → V . It assigns
to each history hv, with v ∈ Vi, a vertex v
′ such that (v, v′) ∈ E. In an initialized
game (G, v0), σi needs only to be defined for histories starting in v0. We denote
by Σi the set of strategies for Player i. A play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is consistent with
σi if for all ρk ∈ Vi, σi(ρ0 . . . ρk) = ρk+1. A strategy σi is positional if it only
depends on the last vertex of the history, i.e., σi(hv) = σi(v) for all hv ∈ Histi.
It is finite-memory if it can be encoded by a finite-state machine.
A strategy profile is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π of strategies, one for each player.
Given an initialized game (G, v0) and a strategy profile σ, there exists an unique
play from v0 consistent with each strategy σi. We call this play the outcome of
σ and denote it by 〈σ〉v0 . We say that σ has cost profile (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π .
Quantitative reachability games In this article, we are interested in reach-
ability games : each player has a target set of vertices that he wants to reach.
Definition 1. A quantitative reachability game G = (A, (Costi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π)
is a game enhanced with a target set Fi ⊆ V for each player i ∈ Π and for all
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i ∈ Π the cost function Costi is defined as follows: for all ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays:
Costi(ρ) = k if k ∈ N is the least index such that ρk ∈ Fi and Costi(ρ) = +∞ if
such index does not exist.
In quantitative reachability games, players have to pay a cost equal to the
number of edges until visiting their own target set or +∞ if it is not visited.
Thus each player aims at minimizing his cost.
Solution concepts In the multiplayer game setting, the solution concepts usu-
ally studied are equilibria. We recall the concepts of Nash equilibrium and sub-
game perfect equilibrium.
Let σ = (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in an initialized game (G, v0). When we
highlight the role of player i, we denote σ by (σi, σ−i) where σ−i is the profile
(σj)j∈Π\{i}. A strategy σ
′
i 6= σi is a deviating strategy of Player i, and it is a
profitable deviation for him if Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) > Costi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0).
The notion of Nash equilibrium is classical: a strategy profile σ in an initial-
ized game (G, v0) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player has an incentive to
deviate unilaterally from his strategy, i.e. no player has a profitable deviation.
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium). Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative
reachability game. The strategy profile σ is an NE if for each i ∈ Π and each
deviating strategy σ′i of Player i, we have Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ Costi(〈σ
′
i, σ−i〉v0).
When considering games played on graphs, a useful refinement of NE is the
concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) which is a strategy profile that is
an NE in each subgame. Formally, given a game G = (A, (Costi)i∈Π), an initial
vertex v0, and a history hv ∈ Hist(v0), the initialized game (G↾h, v) such that
G↾h = (A, (Costi↾h)i∈Π) where Costi↾h(ρ) = Costi(hρ) for all i ∈ Π and ρ ∈ V ω
is called a subgame of (G, v0). Notice that (G, v0) is a subgame of itself. Moreover
if σi is a strategy for player i in (G, v0), then σi↾h denotes the strategy in (G↾h, v)
such that for all histories h′ ∈ Histi(v), σi↾h(h′) = σi(hh′). Similarly, from a
strategy profile σ in (G, v0), we derive the strategy profile σ↾h in (G↾h, v).
Definition 3 (Subgame perfect equilibrium). Let (G, v0) be an initialized
game. A strategy profile σ is an SPE in (G, v0) if for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), σ↾h is
an NE in (G↾h, v).
Clearly, any SPE is an NE and it is stated in Theorem 2.1 in [3] that there
always exists an SPE (and thus an NE) in quantitative reachability games.
Studied problems We conclude this section with the problems studied in
this article. Let us first recall the concepts of social welfare and Pareto opti-
mality. Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative reachability game with G =
(A, (Costi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π). Given ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays(v0), we denote by Visit(ρ)
the set of players who visit their target set along ρ, i.e., Visit(ρ) = {i ∈ Π |
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there exists n ∈ N st. ρn ∈ Fi}.4 The social welfare of ρ, denoted by SW(ρ), is
the pair (|Visit(ρ)|,
∑
i∈Visit(ρ) Costi(ρ)). Note that it takes into account both the
number of players who visit their target set and their accumulated cost to reach
those sets. Finally, let P = {(Costi(ρ))i∈Π | ρ ∈ Plays(v0)} ⊆ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π|.
A cost profile p ∈ P is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0) if it is minimal in P with
respect to the componentwise ordering ≤ on P 5.
Let us now state the studied decision problems. The first two problems
are classical: they ask whether there exists a solution (NE or SPE) σ satis-
fying certain requirements that impose bounds on either (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π or
on SW(〈σ〉v0 ).
Problem 1 (Threshold decision problem). Given an initialized quantitative reach-
ability game (G, v0), given a threshold y ∈ (N∪{+∞})|Π|, decide whether there
exists a solution σ such that (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≤ y.
The most natural requirements are to impose upper bounds on the costs that
the players have to pay and no lower bounds. One might also be interested in
imposing an interval [xi, yi] in which must lie the cost paid by Player i.
In the second problem, constraints are imposed on the social welfare, with
the aim to maximize it. We use the lexicographic ordering on N2 such that
(k, c)  (k′, c′) if and only if (i) k ≥ k′ or (ii) k = k′ and c ≤ c′.
Problem 2 (Social welfare decision problem). Given an initialized quantitative
reachability game (G, v0), given two thresholds k ∈ {0, . . . , |Π |} and c ∈ N,
decide whether there exists a solution σ such that SW(〈σ〉v0 )  (k, c).
Notice that with the lexicographic ordering, we want to first maximize the
number of players who visit their target set, and then to minimize the accumu-
lated cost to reach those sets. Let us now state the last studied problem.
Problem 3 (Pareto optimal decision problem). Given an initialized quantitative
reachability game (G, v0) decide whether there exists a solution σ in (G, v0) such
that (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
Remark 1. Problems 1 and 2 impose constraints with large inequalities. We
could also impose strict inequalities or even a mix of strict and large inequalities.
The results of this article can be easily adapted to those variants.
We conclude this section with an illustrative example.
Example 1. Consider the quantitative reachability game (G, v0) of Figure 1. We
have two players such that the vertices of Player 1 (resp. Player 2) are rounded
(resp. rectangular) vertices. For the moment, the reader should not consider the
value indicated on the right of the vertices’ labeling. Moreover F1 = {v3, v4} and
F2 = {v1, v4}. In this figure, an edge (v, v′) labeled by x should be understood
4 We can easily adapt this definition to histories.
5 For convenience, we prefer to say that p is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0) rather than
in P .
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as a path from v to v′ with length x. Observe that F1 and F2 are both reachable
from the initial vertex v0. Moreover the two Pareto optimal cost profiles are
(3, 3) and (2, 6): take a play with prefix v0v2v4 in the first case, and a play with
prefix v0v2v3v0v1 in the second case.
v0: 3v1: +∞ v2: 1
v3: 0
v4: 0
3 2
Fig. 1. A two-player quantitative reachability game such that F1 = {v3, v4} and F2 =
{v1, v4}
For this example, we claim that there is no NE (and thus no SPE) such
that its cost profile is Pareto optimal (see Problem 3). Assume the contrary and
suppose that there exists an NE σ such that its outcome ρ has cost profile (3, 3),
meaning that ρ begins with v0v2v4. Then Player 1 has a profitable deviation
such that after history v0v2 he goes to v3 instead of v4 in a way to pay a cost
of 2 instead of 3, which is a contradiction. Similarly assume that there exists an
NE σ such that its outcome ρ has cost profile (2, 6), meaning that ρ begins with
v0v2v3v0v1. Then Player 2 has a profitable deviation such that after history v0
he goes to v1 instead of v2, again a contradiction. So there is no NE σ in (G, v0)
such that (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
The previous discussion shows that there is no NE σ such that (0, 0) =
x ≤ (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≤ y = (3, 3) (see Problem 1). This is no longer true
with y = (6, 3). Indeed, one can construct an NE τ whose outcome has prefix
v0v1v0v2v3 and cost profile (6, 3). This also shows that there exists an NE σ (the
same τ as before) that satisfies SW(〈σ〉v0 )  (k, c) = (2, 9) (with τ both players
visit their target set and their accumulated cost to reach it equals 9). ⊓⊔
3 Existence problems
In this section, we show that for particular families of reachability games and
requirements, there is no need to solve the related decision problems because
they always have a positive answer in this case.
We begin with the family constituted by all reachability games with a strongly
connected arena. The next theorem then states that there always exists a solution
that visits all non empty target sets.
Theorem 1. Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative reachability game such
that its arena A is strongly connected. There exists an SPE σ (and thus an NE)
such that its outcome 〈σ〉v0 visits all target sets Fi, i ∈ Π, that are non empty.
Let us comment this result. For this family of games, the answer to Problem 1
is always positive for particular thresholds. In case of quantitative reachability,
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take strict constraints < yi = +∞ if Fi 6= ∅ and large constraints ≤ +∞
otherwise. The answer to Problem 2 is also always positive for threshold k =
|{i | Fi 6= ∅}| and c = +∞.
In the statement of Theorem 1, as the arena is strongly connected, Fi is non
empty if and only if Fi is reachable from v0. Also notice that the hypothesis
that the arena is strongly connected is necessary. Indeed, it is easy to build an
example with two players (Player 1 and Player 2) such that from v0 it is not
possible to reach both F1 and F2.
We now turn to the second result of this section. The next theorem states that
even with only two players there exists an initialized quantitative reachability
game that has no NE with a cost profile which is Pareto optimal. To prove
this result, we only have to come back to the quantitative reachability game of
Figure 1. We explained in Example 1 that there is no NE in this game such that
its cost profile is Pareto optimal.
Theorem 2. There exists an initialized quantitative reachability game with |Π | =
2 that has no NE with a cost profile which is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
Notice that in the qualitative setting, in two-player games, there always exists
an NE (resp. SPE) such that the gain profile6 is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0)
however this existence result cannot be extended to three players.
4 Solving decision problems
In this section, we provide the complexity results for the different problems with-
out any assumption on the arena of the game. Even if we provide complexity
lower bounds, the main part of our contribution is to give the upper bounds.
Roughly speaking the decision algorithms work as follows: they guess a path
and check that it is the outcome of an equilibrium satisfying the relevant prop-
erty (such as Pareto optimality). In order to verify that a path is an equilibrium
outcome, we rely on the outcome characterization of equilibria, presented in Sec-
tion 4.2. These characterizations rely themselves on the notion of λ-consistent
play, introduced in Section 4.1. As the guessed path should be finitely repre-
sentable, we show that we can only consider λ-consistent lassoes, in Section 4.3.
Finally, we expose the philosophy of the algorithms providing the upper bounds
on the complexity of the three problems in Section 4.4.
4.1 λ-consistent play
We here define the labeling function, λ : V → N ∪ {+∞} used to obtain the
outcome characterization of equilibria. Given a vertex v ∈ V along a play ρ,
intuitively, the value λ(v) represents the maximal number of steps within which
the player who owns this vertex should reach his target set along ρ starting from
v. A play which satisfies the constraints given by λ is called a λ-consistent play.
6 In the qualitative setting, each player obtain a gain that he wants to maximize: either
1 (if he visits his target set) or 0 (otherwise), all definitions are adapted accordingly.
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Definition 4 (λ-consistent play). Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability
game and λ : V → N ∪ {+∞} be a labeling function. Let ρ ∈ Plays be a play,
we say that ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is λ-consistent if for all i ∈ Π and all k ∈ N such that
i 6∈ Visit(ρ0 . . . ρk) and ρk ∈ Vi: Costi(ρ≥k) ≤ λ(ρk).
The link between λ-consistency and equilibrium is made in Section 4.2.
Example 2. Let us come back to Example 1 and assume that the values indicated
on the right of the vertices’ labeling represent the valuation of a labeling function
λ. Let us first consider the play ρ = (v0v2v4)
ω with cost profile (3, 3). We have
that Cost2(ρ) = 3 ≤ λ(v0) = 3 but Cost1(ρ≥1) = Cost1(v2v4(v0v2v4)ω) = 2 >
λ(v2) = 1. This means that (v0v2v4)
ω is not λ-consistent. Secondly, one can
easily see that the play v0v1(v0v2v3)
ω is λ-consistent.
4.2 Characterizations
Outcome characterization of Nash equilibria To define the labeling func-
tion λ which allows us to obtain this characterization, we need to study the ratio-
nal behavior of one player playing against the coalition of the other players. In or-
der to do so, with a quantitative reachability game G = (A, (Costi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π),
we can associate |Π | two-player zero-sum quantitative games [7]. For each i ∈ Π ,
we depict by Gi the (quantitative) coalitional game associated with Player i. In
such a game Player i (which becomes Player Min) wants to reach the target
set F = Fi within a minimum number of steps, and the coalition of all players
except Player i (which forms one player called Player Max, aka −i) aims to
avoid it or, if it is not possible, maximize the number of steps until reaching F .
Given a coalitional game Gi and a vertex v ∈ V , the value of Gi from v,
depicted by Vali(v), allows us to know what is the lowest (resp. greatest) cost
(resp. gain) that Player Min (resp. Player Max) can ensure to obtain from v.
Moreover, as quantitative coalitional games are determined these values always
exist and can be computed in polynomial time [7,8,13].
An optimal strategy for PlayerMin (resp. PlayerMax) in a coalitional game
Gi is a strategy which ensures that, from all vertex v ∈ V , Player Min (resp.
Player Max) will pay (resp. obtain) at most Vali(v) by following this strategy
whatever the strategy of the other player. For each i ∈ Π , we know that there
always exist optimal strategies for both players in Gi. Moreover, we can always
found optimal strategies which are positional [7].
In our characterization, we show that the outcomes of NEs are exactly the
plays which are Val-consistent, with the labeling function Val defined in this
way: for all v ∈ V , Val(v) = Vali(v) if v ∈ Vi.
Theorem 3 (Characterization of NEs). Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reach-
ability game and let ρ ∈ Plays(v0) be a play, the next assertions are equivalent:
1. there exists an NE σ such that 〈σ〉v0 = ρ;
2. the play ρ is Val-consistent.
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Additionally, if ρ = hℓω is a lasso, we can replace the first item by: there exists
an NE σ with memory in O(|hℓ|+ |Π |) and such that 〈σ〉v0 = ρ.
The main idea is that if the second assertion is false, then there exists a player
i who has an incentive to deviate along ρ. Indeed, if there exists k ∈ N such that
Costi(ρ≥k) > Vali(ρk) (ρk ∈ Vi) it means that Player i can ensure a better
cost for him even if the other players play in coalition and in an antagonistic
way. Thus, Player i has a profitable deviation. For the second implication, the
Nash equilibrium σ is defined as follows: all players follow the outcome ρ but
if one player, assume it is Player i, deviates from ρ the other players form a
coalition −i and punish the deviator by playing the optimal strategy of player
−i in the coalitional game Gi. Thus, if ρ = hℓω, a player has to remember: (i)
hℓ to know both what he has to play and if someone has deviated and (ii) who
is the deviator.
Example 3. Let us go back to Example 2, in this example the used labeling
function λ is in fact the labeling function Val. We proved in Example 2 that
the play (v0v2v4)
ω is not Val-consistent and so not the outcome of an NE by
Theorem 3. On the contrary, we have seen that the play v0v1(v0v2v3)
ω is Val-
consistent and it means that it is the outcome of an NE (again by Theorem 3).
Notice that we have already proved these two facts in Example 1.
Outcome characterization of subgame perfect equilibria In the previous
section, we proved that the set of plays which are Val-consistent is equal to the
set of outcomes of NEs. We now want to have the same kind of characterization
for SPEs. We may not use the notion of Val-consistent plays because there exist
plays which are Val-consistent but which are not the outcome of an SPE. But, we
can recover the characterization of SPEs thanks to a different labeling function
defined in [6] that we depict by λ∗. Notice that, λ∗ is not defined on the vertices
of the game G but on the vertices of the extended game X associated with G.
Vertices in such a game are the vertices in G equipped with a subset of players
who have already visited their target set. This game is also a reachability game
thus all concepts and definitions introduced in Section 2 hold. Moreover, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between SPEs in G and its extended game. This is
the reason why we solve the different decision problems on the extended games
(X , x0), where x0 = (v0,Visit(v0)), instead of (G, v0). More details are given in
[6]. However, it is very important to notice that some of our results depend on
|V | (resp. |Π |) that are the number of vertices (resp. players) in G and not in X .
Theorem 4 ([6] Characterization of SPEs). Let (G, v0) be a quantitative
reachability game and (X , x0) be its extended game and let ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈
Plays(x0) be a play in the extended game, the next assertions are equivalent:
1. there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium σ such that 〈σ〉x0 = ρ;
2. the play ρ is λ∗-consistent.
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4.3 Sufficiency of lassoes
In this section, we provide technical results which given a λ-consistent play
produce an associated λ-consistent lasso. In the sequel, we show that working
with these lassoes is sufficient for the algorithms.
The associated lassoes are built by eliminating some unnecessary cycles and
then identifying a prefix hℓ such that ℓ can be repeated infinitely often. An
unnecessary cycle is a cycle inside of which no new player visits his target set.
More formally, let ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ρk . . . ρk+ℓ . . . be a play in G, if ρk = ρk+ℓ and
Visit(ρ0 . . . ρk) = Visit(ρ0 . . . ρk+ℓ) then the cycle ρk . . . ρk+ℓ is called an unnec-
essary cycle.
We call: (P1) the procedure which eliminates an unnecessary cycle, i.e., let
ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ρk . . . ρk+ℓ . . . such that ρk . . . ρk+ℓ is an unnecessary cycle, ρ be-
comes ρ′ = ρ0 . . . ρkρk+ℓ+1 . . . and (P2) the procedure which turns ρ into a lasso
ρ′ = hℓω by copying ρ long enough for all players to visit their target set and
then to form a cycle after the last player has visited his target set. If no player
visits his target set along ρ, then (P2) only copies ρ long enough to form a cycle.
Notice that, given ρ ∈ Plays, applying (P1) or (P2) may involve a decreasing
of the costs but for both Visit(ρ) = Visit(ρ′) and for (P2) Visit(h) = Visit(ρ′).
Additionally, applying (P1) until it is no longer possible and then (P2), leads to
a lasso with length at most (|Π |+1) · |V | and cost less than or equal to |Π | · |V |
for players who have visited their target set.
Additionally, applying (P1) or (P2) on λ-consistent play preserves this prop-
erty. It is stated in Lemma 1 which is in particular true for extended games.
Lemma 1. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and ρ ∈ Plays be a
λ-consistent play for a given labeling function λ. If ρ′ is the play obtained by
applying (P1) or (P2) on ρ, then ρ′ is λ-consistent.
These properties on (P1) and (P2) allow us to claim that it is sufficient to
deal with lassoes with polynomial length to solve Problems 1 and 3 for NEs and
it give us some bounds on the needed memory and the costs for each problem.
Corollary 1. Let σ be an NE (resp. SPE) in a quantitative reachability game
(G, v0) (resp. (X , x0) its extended game) and y ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π|. Let w0 = v0
(resp. w0 = x0). If (Costi(〈σ〉w0 ))i∈Π ≤ y, then there exists τ an NE (resp.
SPE) in (G, v0) (resp. (X , x0)) such that:
– (Costi(〈τ〉w0 ))i∈Π ≤ y;
– 〈τ〉w0 is a lasso hℓ
ω such that |hℓ| ≤ (|Π |+ 1) · |V |;
– for each i ∈ Visit(〈τ〉w0 ), Costi(〈τ〉w0 ) ≤ |Π | · |V |;
– τ has memory in O((|Π |+1)·|V |) (resp. O(2|Π| ·|Π |·|V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1)).
Proposition 1. Let (G, v0) (resp. (X , x0) its extended game) be a quantitative
reachability game and let σ be an NE (resp. SPE). Let w0 = v0 (resp. w0 = x0).
If we have that (Costi(〈σ〉w0 ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(w0), then:
– for all i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉w0 ), Costi(〈σ〉w0) ≤ |V | · |Π |;
– there exists τ an NE (resp. SPE) such that 〈τ〉w0 = hℓ
ω, |hℓ| ≤ (|Π |+1) · |V |
and (Costi(〈σ〉w0 ))i∈Π = (Costi(〈τ〉w0 ))i∈Π .
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4.4 Algorithms
In this section, we provide the main ideas behind our algorithms.
To solve Problem 17 (resp. Problem 3) for NEs, we use Corollary 1 (resp.
Proposition 1) which ensures that if there exists an NE which satisfies the condi-
tions8, there exists another one with a lasso outcome of polynomial length. The
algorithm works as follows:(i) it guesses a lasso of polynomial length;(ii) it veri-
fies that the cost profile of this lasso satisfies the conditions given by the problem
(resp. is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0)) and (iii) it verifies that the lasso is the
outcome of an NE (Theorem 3). Notice that this latter step is done in polyno-
mial time as the lasso has a polynomial length and the values of the coalitional
games are computed in polynomial time.
To solve Problem 2 (resp. Problem 3 for SPEs), we use the algorithm de-
signed for Problem 1. Each algorithm works as follows:(i) it guesses a cost profile
c;(ii) it verifies that c satisfies the conditions given by the problem and (iii) it
checks, thanks to the algorithm for Problem 1, if there exists an equilibrium with
cost profile smaller than c (resp. equal to c).
Notice that for Problem 3, we need to have an oracle allowing us to know if
c is Pareto optimal. This leads us to study Problem 4 which lies in co-NP.
Problem 4. Given a reachability game (G, v0) (resp. its extended game (X , x0))
and a lasso ρ ∈ Plays(v0) (resp. ρ ∈ Plays(x0)), we want to decide if (Costi(ρ))i∈Π
is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0) (resp. Plays(x0)).
4.5 Results
Thanks to the previous discussions in Section 4.4, we obtain the following results.
Notice that we do not provide the proof for the NP-hardness (resp. PSPACE-
hardness) as it is very similar to the one given in [10] (resp. [6]).
Theorem 5. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game.
– For NEs: Problem 1 and Problem 2 are NP-complete while Problem 3 is
NP-hard and belongs to ΣP2 .
– For SPEs: Problems 1, 2 and 3 are PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 6. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game.
– For NEs: for each decision problem, if its answer is positive, then there
exists a strategy profile σ with memory in O((|Π | + 1) · |V |) which satisfies
the conditions.
– For SPEs: for each decision problem, if the answer is positive, then there
exists a strategy profile σ with memory in O(2|Π| · |Π | · |V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1)
which satisfies the conditions.
– For both NEs and SPEs: (i) for Problem 1 and Problem 3, σ is such that: if
i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉v0 ), Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ |Π | · |V | and (ii) for Problem 2, σ is such
that:
∑
i∈Visit(〈σ〉v0 )
Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ |Π |
2 · |V |.
7 As Problem 1 is already solved in PSPACE for SPEs [6] we here focus only on NEs.
8 Satisfying the conditions is either satisfying the constraints (Problem 1 and Prob-
lem 2) or having a cost profile which is Pareto optimal (Problem 3).
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A Complements to Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we begin with a preliminary lemma and the proof of The-
orem 1 follows.
Lemma 2. Let G be a quantitative reachability game. Then for all v0 ∈ V for
which some target set Fj , j ∈ Π, is reachable from v0, there exists an SPE
in (G, v0) whose outcome ρ visits at least one target set Fi, i ∈ Π, that is,
|Visit(ρ)| ≥ 1.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1 in [3], there exists an SPE in (G, v0) for each initial vertex
v0 ∈ V . Consider the set U ⊆ V of vertices u for which some Fj is reachable
from u, and the set U ′ ⊆ U of those vertices u for which there is an SPE in
(G, u) that visits at least one target set. We have to prove that U = U ′.
Assume the contrary and let v0 ∈ U \U
′. We claim that there exists an edge
(u, u′) such that u ∈ U \U ′ and u′ ∈ U ′. Indeed as v0 ∈ U , there exists a history
h = v0v1 . . . vk with vk ∈ Fj for some j. Hence vk ∈ U ′ since the outcome of all
SPEs in (G, vk) immediately visits Fj . As along h we begin with v0 ∈ U \U ′ and
we end with vk ∈ U ′, there must exist an edge (vℓ, vℓ+1) = (u, u′) with u ∈ U \U ′
and u′ ∈ U ′.
Let σu (resp. σu
′
) be an SPE in (G, u) (resp. in (G, u′)). As u′ ∈ U ′, we can
suppose that the outcome of σu
′
visits some target set Fj . From σ
u and σu
′
,
we are going to construct another SPE τ in (G, u) whose outcome will now visit
this set Fj . This will lead to a contradiction with u ∈ U \ U ′. We define such a
strategy profile τ equal to σu except that it is replaced by σu
′
for all histories
with prefix uu′. More precisely,
– for the particular history u, if u ∈ Vi, then τi(u) = u′,
– for each history uu′h ∈ Histi, i ∈ Π , we define τi(uu′h) = σu
′
i (u
′h),
– for each history uv′h ∈ Histi, i ∈ Π , with v′ 6= u′, we define τi(uv′h) =
σui (uv
′h).
Clearly the outcome of τ is equal to u〈σu
′
〉u′ and thus visits Fj . It remains to
show that τ is an SPE, i.e., that τ↾h is an NE in the subgame (G↾h, v) for all
hv ∈ Histi(v), i ∈ Π .
– For all histories hv that begin with uv′ with v′ 6= u′, clearly τ↾h is an NE in
(G↾h, v) because τ↾h = σu↾h and σ
u is an SPE.
– Take any history hv that begin with uu′, and let h = uh′. Let τ ′i be a
deviating strategy for player i in (G↾h, v). By definition of τ we have
〈τ↾h〉v = u〈σ
u′
↾h′〉v
〈(τ ′i , τ↾h,−i)〉v = u〈(τ
′
i , σ
u′
↾h′,−i)〉v
Moreover, as u belongs to no target set, we have Costi(uρ) = 1 + Costi(ρ)
for all plays ρ ∈ Plays(u′). It follows that if τ ′i is a profitable deviation for
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player i with respect to τ↾h, it is also a profitable deviation with respect to
σu
′
↾h′ . The latter case never holds because σ
u′ is an SPE (and in particular
σu
′
↾h′ is an NE). Therefore τ↾h is an NE in (G↾h, v).
– It remains to consider the history u and to prove that τ is an NE in (G, u).
From what has been gathered so far, only player i such that u ∈ Vi might
have a profitable deviation by deviating at the initial vertex u with a strategy
τ ′i such that τ
′
i(u) = v
′ 6= u′ = τi(u). Notice that since u ∈ U \ U ′, we have
Costi(〈σu〉u) = +∞ and since σu is an SPE (and in particular an NE), we
have Costi(〈τ
′
i , σ
u
−i〉u) = +∞. Moreover as τ
′
i(u) = v
′ 6= u′ and by definition
of τ , we have Costi(〈τ ′i , σ
u
−i〉u) = Costi(〈τ
′
i , τ−i〉u) = +∞. It follows that τ
′
i
is not a profitable deviation for player i with respect to τ , and then τ is an
NE in (G, u).
⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 1). Let (G, v0), with G = (A, (Costi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π), be an ini-
tialized quantitative reachability game such that its arena is strongly connected.
Assume by contradiction that there exists no SPE in (G, v0) whose outcome vis-
its all target sets Fi, i ∈ Π , that are non empty. By Theorem 2.1 in [3], there
exists an SPE σ in (G, v0), and we take such an SPE σ whose outcome ρ = 〈σ〉v0
visits a maximum number of target sets, say Fi1 , Fi2 , . . . , Fik . Thus by assump-
tion there exists at least one Fj 6= ∅ with j 6∈ {i1, . . . , ik} that is not visited by
ρ. Thanks to Lemma 2, we are going to define from σ another SPE τ in (G, v0)
whose outcome visits all Fi1 , . . . , Fik as well as an additional target set. This will
lead to a contradiction.
Consider a prefix ρ0ρ1 . . . ρℓ of ρ that visits all Fi1 , . . . , Fik . We denote it
by gu with u = ρℓ. From G we define the quantitative reachability game G′ =
(A, (Cost′i)i∈Π , (F
′
i )i∈Π) with the same arena A and such that F
′
i = ∅ if i ∈
{i1, . . . , ik} and F ′i = Fi otherwise ((Cost
′
i)i∈Π is defined with respect to (F
′
i )i∈Π
as in Definition 1). Notice that F ′j = Fj is not empty and it is reachable from u
since A is strongly connected. Therefore by Lemma 2, there exists an SPE σ′ in
(G′, u) that visits at least one target set F ′j′ . From σ and σ
′, we define a strategy
profile τ in (G, v0) as follows: let h ∈ Histi(v0),
– if h = guh′ for some h′, then τi(h) = σ
′
i(uh
′),
– otherwise τi(h) = σi(h).
Thus, τ acts as σ, except that after a history beginning with gu, it acts as σ′.
Clearly the outcome of τ is equal to g〈σ′〉u and thus visits F ′j′ = Fj′ in addition
to Fi1 , . . . , Fik . It remains to show that τ is an SPE. Consider hv ∈ Histi(v0),
i ∈ Π , and let us show that τ↾h is an NE in (G↾h, v).
– If neither hv is a prefix of gu nor gu is a prefix of hv, then τ↾h = σ↾h by
definition of τ , and τ↾h is an NE in (G↾h, v) because σ is an SPE in (G, v0).
– If gu is a prefix of hv, let h′ such that gh′ = h. Suppose first that hv visits
Fi, then player i has clearly no incentive to deviate in (G↾h, v). Suppose now
that hv does not visit Fi, then i 6∈ {i1, . . . , ik} and F ′i = Fi by definition of
G′. Hence for all plays π in (G↾h, v) that start in v, h′π is a play in (G′, u) that
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start in u, and we have Costi(hπ) = |gu|+Cost
′
i(h
′π). Hence by definition of
τ , a profitable deviation for player i with respect to τ↾h (G↾h, v) would be a
profitable deviation with respect to σ′↾h′ in (G
′
↾h′ , v). The latter case cannot
happen as σ′ is an SPE in (G′, u) and it follows that τ↾h is an NE in (G↾h, v).
– Consider the last case where hv is a prefix of gu with hv 6= gu, and let
hh′ = g. Consider τ ′i a deviating strategy for player i with respect to τ↾h in
the subgame (G↾h, v), and let ρ′ = 〈(τ ′i , τ↾h,−i)〉v. Without loss of generality,
we can suppose that h′u is not a prefix of ρ′ since this case was treated
at the previous item. Notice that if i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}, then Costi(〈τ↾h〉v) =
Costi(〈σ↾h〉v), otherwise Costi(〈τ↾h〉v) ≤ +∞ = Costi(〈σ↾h〉v). In both cases,
as h′u is a prefix of both 〈τ↾h〉v and 〈σ↾h〉v, but not a prefix of ρ′, if τ ′i was
a profitable deviation for player i with respect to τ↾h, it would also be a
profitable deviation with respect to σ↾h which is impossible since σ is an
SPE.
⊓⊔
We end with an example which shows that the hypothesis Theorem 1 that
the arena is strongly connected is necessary.
Example 4. Consider the initialized qualitative reachability game (G, v0) of Fig-
ure 2. There are two players, Player 1 who owns round vertices and Player 2
who owns square vertices, and F1 = {v1}, F2 = {v2}. Clearly there is a unique
NE σ = (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) such that σ1(v0) = v1 and σ2(v1) = v1, σ2(v2) = v2.
Its outcome only visits F1 (and not F2). ⊓⊔
v0v1 v2
Fig. 2. A qualitative reachability game with two players such that F1 = {v1} and
F2 = {v2}.
B Complements to Section 4.2
B.1 Complements about coalitionnal games
We provide the formal definitions of (quantitative) coalitional game, value and
optimal strategy.
Definition 5 ((Quantitative) Coalitional game).
Let A = (Π,V,E; (Vi)i∈Π) be an arena and G = (A, (Costi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π) be
a quantitative reachability game with |Π | ≥ 2. With each player i ∈ Π, we can
associate a two-player zero-sum quantitative reachability game depicted by Gi =
(Ai, (CostMin,GainMax), F ) and defined as follows: i) Ai = ({i,−i}, V, (Vi, V \Vi), E)
where Player i (resp. −i) can be called Player Min (resp. Player Max); ii)
CostMin = Costi and GainMax = CostMin and iii) F = Fi.
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Definition 6 (Value). Let Gi be a coalitional game and v ∈ V be a vertex, we
define the value of Gi from v as :
Vali(v) = inf
σ1∈ΣMin
sup
σ2∈ΣMax
CostMin(〈σ1, σ2〉v). (1)
Remark that, as for each i ∈ Π the coalitional game Gi is determined
([7]) and CostMin = GainMax, the equality (1) could be defined as V ali(v) =
supσ2∈ΣMax infσ1∈ΣMin GainMax(〈σ1, σ2〉v).
Definition 7 (Optimal strategy). Let Gi be a coalitional game, we say that
σ∗1 ∈ ΣMin is an optimal strategy for player Min if, for all v ∈ V , we have that:
supσ2∈ΣMax CostMin(〈σ
∗
1 , σ2〉v) ≤ Vali(v). Similarly, we say that σ
∗
2 ∈ ΣMax is
an optimal strategy for player Max if, for all v ∈ V , we have that:
infσ1∈ΣMin GainMax(〈σ1, σ
∗
2〉v) ≥ Vali(v).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof (of Theorem 3). Let us first recall that, for all i ∈ Π , the coalitional game
Gi is determined and there are optimal positional strategies for both players
(σ∗i , σ
∗
−i). Moreover as CostMin = GainMax, for all v ∈ V , we have:
inf
σi∈ΣMin
CostMin(〈σi, σ
∗
−i〉v) = Vali(v) = sup
σ−i∈ΣMax
CostMin(〈σ
∗
i , σ−i〉v).
From the optimal strategy σ∗−i in Gi we can extract a strategy σ
∗
j,i in G. Notice
also that even if σ∗i is a strategy in Gi, we can use it as a strategy for Player i
in G. Let us prove the equivalence between the two assertions.
1⇒ 2: Let σ be a Nash equilibrium in (G, v0) such that 〈σ〉v0 = ρ. Let
us assume by contradiction that there exist i ∈ Π and k ∈ N such that i 6∈
Visit(ρ0 . . . ρk) and ρk ∈ Vi such that:
Costi(ρ≥k) > Vali(ρk). (2)
Let h = ρ0 . . . ρk−1, we can write:
Costi(ρ≥k) = Costi(〈σ↾h〉ρk). (3)
Additionally, by definition of value in a coalitional game and thanks to the fact
that the optimal strategies are positional:
Vali(ρk) = sup
τ−i∈ΣMax
CostMin(〈σ
∗
i , τ−i〉ρk)
≥ CostMin(〈σ
∗
i , σ−i↾h〉ρk)
= Costi(〈σ
∗
i , σ−i↾h〉ρk) (4)
where σ∗i is the optimal strategy of Player i in Gi and σi is an abuse of notation
to depict the strategy of the coalition −i = Π\{i} which follows strategies σj
for all j 6= i.
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By (2), (3) and (4), it follows that:
Costi(〈σ
∗
i , σ−i↾h〉ρk) < Costi(〈σ↾h〉ρk).
As i 6∈ Visit(h) by hypothesis, we can conclude that:
Costi(h〈σ
∗
i , σ−i↾h〉ρk) < Costi(h〈σ↾h〉ρk) = Costi(ρ).
This means that following σi along h and then σ
∗
i once he reaches ρk is a
profitable deviation for Player i. This concludes the proof.
2⇒ 1: Let τ be a strategy profile such that 〈τ〉v0 = ρ. From τ we aims
to construct a Nash equilibrium with the same outcome. The main idea is the
following one: first, all player play according to τ . But if a player, let us call him
Player i deviates from τi, the other players form a coalition and each of them
plays their strategy obtained thanks to the strategy σ∗−i in Gi.
In order to define properly the researched Nash equilibrium, we have to define
a punishment function P : Hist(v0) → Π ∪ {⊥} which allows us to know who
is the player who has deviated for the first time from τ . So for all h ∈ Hist(v0),
P (h) =⊥ if no player has yet deviated and P (h) = i for some i ∈ Π if Player i
is the first player who has deviated along h. We can define P as follows: for the
initial vertex P (v0) =⊥ and then for all history hv ∈ Hist(v0) with v ∈ V :
P (hv) =


⊥ if P (h) =⊥ and hv is a prefix of ρ,
i if P (h) =⊥ , hv is not a prefix of ρ and h ∈ Histi,
P (h) otherwise.
.
We now define σ. For all i ∈ Π and for all h ∈ Histi(v0):
σi(h) =


τi(h) if P (h) =⊥,
σ∗i (h) if P (h) = i,
σ∗
i,P (h)(h) otherwise
.
It is clear that 〈σ〉v0 = ρ. It remains to prove that σ is a Nash equilibrium
in (G, v0). Let us assume that σ is not an NE. It means that there exists a
profitable deviation depicted by σ˜i for some player i. We chose i such that i is
the first player who has profitable deviation from σ along ρ. Let ρ˜ = 〈σ˜i, σ−i〉v0
the outcome such that Player i plays his profitable deviation. As σ˜i is a profitable
deviation we have:
Costi(ρ˜) < Costi(ρ). (5)
Moreover as ρ and ρ˜ both begin in v0, they have a common prefix. Let
hv ∈ Histi this longest common prefix. We have that: ρ = h〈σ↾h〉v and ρ˜ =
h〈σ˜i↾h, σ−i↾h〉v. Notice that i 6∈ Visit(hv). But, by definition of σ and as the
optimal strategies in Gi are positional, we can rewrite these two equalities as
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follows: ρ = h〈τ↾h〉v and ρ˜ = h〈σ˜i↾h, (σ
∗
j,i)j∈Π\{i}〉v. Additionally, thanks to the
definition of the value in the coalitional game Gi:
Vali(v) = inf
µi∈ΣMin
CostMin(〈µi, σ
∗
−i〉v)
≤ CostMin(〈σ˜i↾h, σ
∗
−i〉v)
= Costi(〈σ˜i↾h, (σ
∗
j,i)j∈Π\{i}〉v). (6)
By hypothesis, as hv is a prefix of ρ and i 6∈ Visit(hv), we have that Vali(v) ≥
Costi(〈τ↾h〉v). Thus by (6), it follows that:
Costi(〈σ˜i↾h, (σ
∗
j,i)j∈Π\{i}〉v) ≥ Costi(〈τ↾h〉v).
And thanks to the definition of the cost function associated with quantitative
reachability games, we have that:
Costi(h〈σ˜i↾h, (σ
∗
j,i)j∈Π\{i}〉v) ≥ Costi(h〈τ↾h〉v).
Thus, we can conclude that Costi(ρ˜) ≥ Costi(ρ) which leads to a contradic-
tion with (5). This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
B.3 Finite machine which represents strategies in Theorem 3
A finite-state Machine M = (M,m0, αu, αn) is such that M is a finite set of
states (the memory of the strategy), m0 ∈ M is the initial memory state,
αu : M × V → M is the update function, and αn : M × Vi → V is the next-
action function. The machine M defines a strategy σi such that σi(hv) =
αn(α̂u(m0, h), v) for all histories hv ∈ Histi, where α̂u(m, ǫ) = m and α̂u(m,hv) =
αu(α̂u(m,h), v) for all m ∈M and hv ∈ Hist. The size of the strategy σi is the
size |M | of its machine M. Note that σi is positional when |M | = 1.
Formally, let ρ = ρ0 . . . ρk−1(ρk . . . ρn)
ω, we define for all i ∈ Π a finite-state
machine Mi = (M,m0, αu, αn) where:
– M = {ρ0ρ0, ρ0ρ1, . . . , ρn−1ρn, ρnρk} ∪Π .
The set {ρ0ρ0, ρ0ρ1, . . . , ρn−1ρn, ρnρk} allows us to be sure that the outcome
ρ is well followed by all the players. Once it is no longer the case, we only
have to retain who has deviated, this is the role of Π . Notice that, even if
we can have ρmρm+1 = ρm′ρm′+1 along ρ, the edges ρmρm+1 and ρm′ρm′+1
are depicted by two different memory state in M . Thus |M | = |hℓ|+2+ |Π |.
– m0 = ρ0ρ0 is the memory state which specifies that the plays has not begun
yet.
– αu :M × V →M is defined as follows: for all m ∈M and v ∈ V :
αu(m, v) =


j if m = j ∈ Π or (m = v1v2, with v1, v2 ∈ V, v 6= v2 and v1 ∈ Vj)
ρtρt+1 if m = uρt(with t ∈ {0, . . . , |hℓ| − 1}), u ∈ V and v = ρt
ρnρk otherwise (m = uρn and v = ρn).
.
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– αn :M × Vi → V is defined in this way: for all m ∈M and v ∈ Vi:
αn(m, v) =


ρ1 if m = ρ0ρ0 and v = ρ0
ρt+2 if m = ρtρt+1(with t ∈ {0, . . . , |hℓ| − 2}) and v = ρt+1
ρk if m = ρn−1ρn and v = ρn
σ∗i (v) if m = i
σ∗i,j(v) otherwise
.
B.4 Complements about extended game
We here provide the formal definition of an extended game.
Definition 8 (Extended game). Let G = (A, (Costi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π) be a quan-
titative reachability game with an arena A = (Π,V,E, (Vi)i∈Π), and let v0 be an
initial vertex. The extended game of G is equal to X = (X, (CostXi )i∈Π , (F
X
i )i∈Π)
with the arena X = (Π,V X , EX , (V Xi )i∈Π), such that:
– V X = V × 2Π
– ((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX if and only if (v, v′) ∈ E and I ′ = I ∪{i ∈ Π | v′ ∈ Fi}
– (v, I) ∈ V Xi if and only if v ∈ Vi
– (v, I) ∈ FXi if and only if i ∈ I
– for each ρ ∈ PlaysX , Cost
X
i (ρ) is equal to the least index k such that ρk ∈
FXi , and to +∞ if no such index exists.
The initialized extended game (X , x0) associated with the initialized game (G, v0)
is such that x0 = (v0, I0) with I0 = {i ∈ Π | v0 ∈ Fi}.
C Complements to Section 4.3
Lemma 3. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and ρ ∈ Plays be a
play.
– If ρ′ is obtained by applying (P1) on ρ, then (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π ≤ (Costi(ρ))i∈Π
– If ρ′ is obtained by applying (P2) on ρ, then (Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π = (Costi(ρ))i∈Π .
– Applying (P1) until it is no longer possible and then (P2), leads to a lasso
ρ′ with length at most (|Π | + 1) · |V | and Costi(ρ′) ≤ |V | · |Π | for each
i ∈ Visit(ρ′).
Remark 2 (about Lemma 3). Notice that, given a quantitative reachability game
(G, v0), as its extended game (X , x0) is in particular a quantitative reachability
game, all statements of Lemma 3 hold.
But, if we only apply the third assertion on (X , x0), we obtain bounds on
the size of the lasso and on the cost of plays which depends on |V X |. It means
that it is exponential on the size of the initial game G.
In fact, even for the extended game (X , x0) we can obtain the that: applying
(P1) until it is no longer possible and then (P2), leads to a lasso ρ′ with size at
most (|Π |+ 1) · |V | and Costi(ρ′) ≤ |V | · |Π | for each i ∈ Visit(ρ′) where |V | is
the number of vertices in G.
22 T. Brihaye et al.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof (of Lemma 1). We begin by proving the assertion for (P1). Let ρ be a
λ-consistent play and we apply (P1) on it to obtain ρ′. Then, for all i ∈ Π ,
Costi(ρ
′) ≤ Costi(ρ). And in particular, for all i ∈ Π and for all n ∈ N,
Costi(ρ
′
≥n) ≤ Costi(ρ≥ϕ(n)) (7)
where ϕ is the injective function which matches a node in ρ′ with its correspond-
ing node in ρ, i.e., for all n ∈ N, ρ′n = ρϕ(n). Let i ∈ Π and k ∈ N such that
i 6∈ Visit(ρ′0 . . . ρ
′
k) and ρ
′
k ∈ Vi, we have to prove that Costi(ρ
′
≥k) ≤ λ(ρ
′
k). By
construction of ρ′ and by (7), we have that
Costi(ρ
′
≥k) ≤ Costi(ρ≥ϕ(k)).
But, as ρ is λ-consistent, we also have that:
Costi(ρ≥ϕ(k)) ≤ λ(ρϕ(k)) = λi(ρ
′
k)
and we can conclude that Costi(ρ
′
≥k) ≤ λ(ρ
′
k) which proves that ρ
′ is λ-
consistent. This concludes the proof.
For (P2), the assertion holds because ρ′ is a copy of ρ until each player in
Visit(ρ) has visited his target set and Visit(ρ) = Visit(ρ′). ⊓⊔
C.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof of Corollary 1 for NEs The proof of Corollary 1 for NEs is due to
Corollary 2 that we prove below.
Corollary 2. Let σ be an NE in a quantitative reachability game (G, v0), then
there exists τ an NE in (G, v0) such that:
– 〈τ〉v0 is a lasso hℓ
ω such that |hℓ| ≤ (|Π |+ 1) · |V |;
– for all i ∈ Visit(〈τ〉v0 ), Costi(〈τ〉v0 ) ≤ min{Costi(〈σ〉v0 ), |Π | · |V |} and for
all i 6∈ Visit(〈τ〉v0 ), Costi(〈τ〉v0 ) = Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) = +∞;
– the memory of τ is in O((|Π | + 1) · |V |).
Proof (of Corollary 2).
Let ρ be a play in (G, v0) such that ρ = 〈σ〉v0 . We apply procedure (P1) on ρ
until there is no longer an unnecessary cycle and then we apply (P2). In this way,
we obtain a lasso ρ′ = hℓω ∈ Plays(v0). By Lemma 3, |hℓ| ≤ (|Π |+ 1) · |V | and
Costi(hℓ
ω) ≤ min{Costi(〈σ〉v0 ), |Π | · |V |} if i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉v0 ) and Costi(hℓ
ω) =
+∞ otherwise.
By hypothesis and thanks to Theorem 3, we know that ρ is Val-consistent.
Thus, by Lemma 1, ρ′ is Val-consistent. And Theorem 3 for ρ′ concludes the
proof. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Corollary 1 for NEs). It is a direct consequence of Corollary 2. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Corollary 1 for SPEs In this section we assume that all the defini-
tions and notations introduced in [6] are known.
By adapting the concept of (good) symbolic witness (a set of lassoes with
some good properties) used in [4], we can show that if there exists an SPE with
a cost profile c then, there exists one with the same cost profile but with a finite-
memory. This leads to Proposition 2 which allows us to prove Corollary 1 for
SPEs.
Before the statement of the proposition, we formally introduce what is a
(good) symbolic witness. This notion was introduced in [4] for games with prefix-
independent gain functions. We adapt it for quantitative reachability games for
which the cost function is not prefix-independent.
Definition 9 (Symbolic witness). Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative
reachability game and (X , (v0, I0)) its extended game. Let I be a subset of (Π ∪
{0})× V × 2Π such that:
I = {(0, v0, I0)} ∪ {(i, v
′, I ′) | there exists ((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX
with (v, I), (v′, I ′) ∈ Succ∗(v0, I0) and v ∈ Vi}.
A symbolic witness is a set P = {ρi,v,I | (i, v, I) ∈ I} such that each ρi,v,I is
a lasso in X with First(ρi,v,I) = (v, I).
Definition 10 (Good symbolic witness). A symbolic witness P is good
if for all ρj,u,J , ρi,v′,I′ ∈ P, for all suffix ρ ∈ Plays(v, I) of ρj,u,J such that
((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX and (v, I) ∈ V Xi , if i 6∈ I, then we have:
Costi(ρ) ≤ 1 + Costi(ρi,v′I′).
(u, J) . . . (v, I)
∈ Vi
(v′, I ′) . . . . . . ρi,v′,I′
. . . . . . ρj,u,J
ρ
Fig. 3. The condition of Definition 10
Proposition 2. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and (X , (v0, I0))
be its extended game, let c ∈ (N∪{+∞})|Π| and let M = maxi∈Π{ci | ci < +∞}
if this max exists, M = 0 otherwise. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. There exists an SPE with cost profile c in (X , (v0, I0));
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2. Λ∗(v, I) = {ρ ∈ PlaysX(v, I) | ρ is λ
∗-consistent} 6= ∅ for all (v, I) ∈
Succ∗(v0, I0) and there exists ρ ∈ Λ∗(v0, I0) such that (Costi(ρ))i∈Π = c;
3. There exists a good symbolic witness P that contains a lasso ρ0,v0,I0 with cost
profile c and |ρ0,v0,I0 | ≤ M + |V |. Moreover, for each ρi,v,I ∈ P, |ρi,v,I | ≤
O(|V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)) + (|Π |+ 1) · |V |;
4. There exists a finite-memory SPE σ with cost profile c in (X , (v0, I0)) such
that its memory is in O(M + 2|Π| · |Π | · |V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1).
To obtain the bound on the length of the lassoes, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 4 ([6]). Let v be a vertex in the extended game, let MaxCosti(v) =
max{Costi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Plays(v) and ρ is λ∗-consistent}. If MaxCosti(v) < +∞,
then MaxCosti(v) ≤ O(|V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)).
Notice that the proofs of (2 ⇒ 3) and (3 ⇒ 4) are quietly the same that
the one of Proposition 33 in [6]. But, in the following proof, we choose more
adequatly the plays of the form ρi,v′,I′ by picking lassoes with a finite size in the
sets of λ∗-consistent plays beginning in (v′, I ′). It allows us to build and highlight
the existent of a symbolic witness which is a symbolic finite representation of an
SPE who has cost profile equal to c. In this way we build an SPE with a finite
memory.
Proof (of Proposition 2).
1⇒ 2: Theorem 17 in [6].
2⇒ 3: We build a symbolic witness P step by step and then prove that it is
good. At the initialization, P = ∅.
Let ρ ∈ Λ∗(v0, I0) such that (Costi(ρ))i∈Π = c. We apply (P2) on ρ to ob-
tain a lasso ρ0,v0,I0 such that |ρ0,v0,I0 | ≤ M + |V | and (Costi(ρ0,v0,I0))i∈Π = c.
Moreover, as ρ is λ∗-consistent, ρ0,v0,I0 is also λ
∗-consistent (by Lemma 1). We
add ρ0,v0,I0 to P .
For each (i, v, I) ∈ I, let ρ = argmax
ρ′∈Λ∗(v,I)
{Costi(ρ
′)}. We obtain ρi,v,I by copy-
ing ρ until Player i has visited his target set, then by removing the unneces-
sary cycles and apply (P2). If Player i does not visit his target set along ρ,
we remove all the unnecessary cycles (by apply iteratively (P1)) and then we
apply (P2). By the same kind of arguments than for Lemma 3 and Lemma 1,
we obtain that: i) ρi,v,I is λ
∗-consistent, ii) Costi(ρi,v,I) = Costi(ρ) and iii)
|ρi,v,I | ≤ O(|V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)) + (|Π |+1) · |V | (by Lemma 4). We add ρi,v,I to
P .
By construction P is a symbolic witness. It remains to prove that it is good.
Let ρj,u,J and ρi,v′,I′ ∈ P and let ρ ∈ Plays(v, I) be a suffix of ρj,u,J such
that ((v, I), (v′, I ′)) ∈ EX and (v, I) ∈ V Xi , we have to prove that if i 6∈ I,
Costi(ρ) ≤ 1 + Costi(ρi,v′,I′).
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As i 6∈ I, λ∗+1(v, I) = 1+ min
((v,I),(v′,I′)∈EX)
{Costi(ρ
′) | ρ′ ∈ Λ∗(v′, I ′)}, we have
that λ∗(v, I) = λ∗+1(v, I) ≤ 1+Costi(ρi,v′,I′). Finally, as ρj,u,J is λ∗-consistent,
we have:
Costi(ρ) ≤ λ
∗(v, I) ≤ 1 + Costi(ρi,v′,I′).
It concludes the proof.
3⇒ 4: Given a good symbolic witness P with properties given in statement 3,
we show how to build an SPE with a finite memory.
We define a strategy profile σ step by step by induction on the subgames of
(X , (v0, I0)). We first partially define σ such that 〈σ〉(v0,I0) = ρ0,v0,I0 .
Consider next, h(v, I)(v′, I ′) ∈ Hist(v0, I0) with (v, I) ∈ V Xi such that 〈σ↾h〉(v,I)
is already built but not 〈σ↾h(v,I)〉(v′,I′). Then we extend σ such that 〈σ↾h(v,I)〉(v′,I′) =
ρi,v′,I′ .
Let us prove that σ is a very weak SPE (and so an SPE). Consider the
subgame (X↾h, (v, I)) (with (v, I) ∈ V Xi ) and the one-shot deviating strategy
σ′i from σi↾h such that σ
′
i(v, I) = (v
′, I ′). By construction, there exists ρj,u,J
and ρi,v′,I′ ∈ P and h′ ∈ Hist(v0, I0) such that h〈σ↾h〉(v,I) = h
′ρj,u,J and
〈σ↾h(v,I)〉(v′,I′) = ρi,v′,I′ . We have to prove that:
Costi(h〈σ↾h〉(v,I)) ≤ Costi(h(v, I)〈σ↾h(v,I)〉(v′,I′)).
If i ∈ I, then Costi(h〈σ↾h〉(v,I)) = Costi(h(v, I)〈σ↾h(v,I)〉(v′,I′)) = 0. Other-
wise,
Costi(h〈σ↾h〉(v,I)) = Costi(h
′ρj,u,J)
= |h(v, I)|+Costi(ρ) (where ρ is a suffix of ρj,u,J beginning in (v, I))
≤ |h(v, I)|+ 1 + Costi(ρi,v′,I′) (P is a good symbolic witness)
= Costi(h(v, I)ρi,v′,I′)
= Costi(h(v, I)〈σ↾h(v,I)〉v′,I′).
Notice that σ has a cost profile equal to c by construction, as (Costi(ρ0,v0,I0))i∈Π =
c. It remains to prove that σ is finite-memory with memory in O(M +2|Π| · |Π | ·
|V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1). Having (j, u, J) in memory (the last deviating player j
and the vertex (u, J) where he moved), the machine Mi, i ∈ Π , which rep-
resents the strategy σi, has to produce the lasso ρj,u,J of length bounded by
M + (|Π | + 1) · |V | for ρ0,v0,I0 and by O(|V |
(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)) for the others (at
most |Π | · |V | · 2|Π| such lassoes). It leads to a memory in O(M + 2|Π| · |Π | ·
|V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1).
4⇒ 1: Obvious. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Corollary 1 for SPEs).
By hypothesis, we know that there exists an SPE σ such that (Costi(〈σ〉x0)) ≤
y. Let ρ = 〈σ〉x0 , and apply (P1) as long as possible and then (P2) in order
to obtain a lasso ρ′ = hℓω with size at most (|Π | + 1) · |V | and such that
Costi(ρ
′) ≤ min{|V | · |Π |, yi} (Lemma 3). As ρ is the outcome of an SPE, ρ is
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λ∗-consistent and thus ρ′ is also λ∗-consistent (Lemma 1). Thus ρ′ is the outcome
of an SPE.
Thanks to Proposition 2, we know that there exists an SPE τ with finite-
memory in O(2|Π| · |Π | · |V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1) which as the same cost profile
as ρ′. So, Costi(〈τ〉x0) ≤ |V | · |Π | for each i ∈ Visit(〈τ〉x0 ) and τ fulfills the
constraints. Moreover, one can assume that 〈τ〉x0 is a lasso of length at most
(|Π |+ 1) · |V |. ⊓⊔
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof (of Proposition 1). Second item is a direct consequence of the first one.
Thus, let us prove first item.
Let σ be an NE such that its cost profile is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
To get a contradiction, assume that there exists i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉v0 ) such that
Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) > |V | · |Π |. It means that there exists an unnecessary cycle be-
fore Player i reaches his target set. By removing this cycle (applying (P1)), we
obtain a new play ρ′ such that Costi(ρ
′) < Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) and for Player j (j 6= i),
Costj(ρ
′) ≤ Costj(〈σ〉v0 ) (by Lemma 3). It leads to a contradiction with the fact
that (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
The same proof holds for SPE. ⊓⊔
D Complements of Section 4.5
D.1 Proof of Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 for Problem 1
Proposition 3. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game, for NE:
– Problem 1 is NP-easy.
– If the answer to this decision problem is positive, then there exists an NE σ
with memory in O((|Π | + 1) · |V |) which satisfies the constraints and such
that for all i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉v0 ), Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ |V | · |Π |.
Proof. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and let y ∈ (N∪{+∞})|Π|
be a threshold. By Corollary 1, we know that if there exists an NE σ which ful-
fills the constraints, then there exists an other one such that its outcome is of
the form hℓω with |hℓ| ≤ (|Π |+ 1) · |V | and which fulfills the constraints too.
Thus, the NP-algorithm is the following one:
Step 1: Guess a lasso ρ = hℓω with size at most (|Π | + 1) · |V | such that
Visit(ρ) = Visit(h) and verify that ρ is a lasso.
Step 2: Compute (Costi(ρ))i∈Π and verify that (Costi(ρ))i∈Π ≤ y.
Step 3: For each i ∈ Π , compute the values in Gi.
Step 4: Verify that ρ is the outcome of an NE (thanks to Theorem 3): as no
new player reaches his target set along ℓ and ℓ is repeated infinitely often at the
end of the outcome, we only have to check that ρ is Val-consistent along hℓ (an
not along hℓω).
The second item is a direct consequence of Corollary 1. ⊓⊔
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To obtain the NP-completeness it remains to prove the NP-hardness.
Proposition 4. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game, for NE, Prob-
lem 1 is NP-hard.
This proof is based on a polynomial reduction from SAT and is inspired by the
reduction provides for safety objective in [10].
Proof. To prove this proposition, we give a polynomial reduction from the SAT
problem that is NP-complete. Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be the set of variables
and ψ = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cn is a Boolean formula in CNF over X and equals to the
conjunction of the clauses C1, . . . , Cn. This problem is to decide if the formula
ψ is true. Such a formula is true if there exists a valuation I : X → {0, 1} such
that the valuation of X with respect to I evaluates ψ to true.
We build the following quantitative reachability game Gψ = (A, (Costi)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π)
where A = (Π,V,E, (Vi)i∈Π):
– the arenaA is depicted in Figure 4 where the set of playersΠ = {1, . . . , n, n+
1} has n + 1 players: one by clause (players 1 to n) and an additional one.
Vn+1 is depicted by squared vertices and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Vi = {Pi};
– Fn+1 = {Tw};
– for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Fi = {0x | ¬x ∈ Ci} ∪ {1x | x ∈ Ci} ∪ {Tℓ}.
The game Gψ can be build from ψ in polynomial time. Let us show that ψ is
true if and only if there exists an NE σ in (Gψ , x1) such that (Costi(〈σ〉x1 ))i∈Π ≤
(2m, . . . , 2m, 2m+ n).
(⇒) Suppose that ψ is true. Then there exists I : X → {0, 1} such that the
valuation of ψ with respect to I evaluates ψ to true.
Let us consider σ defined in this way:
– for all hv ∈ Histn+1(x1), σn+1(hv) =


I(v) if v = x with x ∈ X
xk+1 if v = 0xk or 1xkwith 0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1
P1 if v = 0xm or 1xm
Tℓ if v = Tℓ
Tw if v = Tw
.
– for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 (resp. for i = n), for all hv ∈ Histi(x1) σi(hv) = Pi+1
(resp. Tw) if hv is consistent with σn+1 and σi(hv) = Tℓ otherwise.
We now prove that σ is an NE. It is clear that 〈σ〉x1 is of the form hP1P2 . . . PnT
ω
w
and as σn+1 corresponds to the valuation I which evaluates ψ to true, we have
that : Costn+1(〈σ〉x1 ) = 2m + n and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Costi(〈σ〉x1 ) ≤ 2m.
Obviously Player n+1 does not have an incentive to deviate from σn+1 because
it is a the least cost that he can obtain. For each player i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
as Player i reaches his target set before he can play, changing his strategy does
not change his cost. Thus, no player has a profitable deviation and σ is an NE.
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(⇐) Suppose that there exists an NE σ in (Gψ , x1) such that Costi(〈σ〉x1) ≤
(2m, . . . , 2m, 2m+ n) and let us prove that ψ is true.
We define I : X → {0, 1} as follows: for x ∈ X , I(x) = σn+1(hx) with
hx a prefix of 〈σ〉x1 . Let us show that the valuation I evaluates ψ to true. As
Costn+1(〈σ〉x1) < +∞, it means that Player n + 1 visits his target set {Tw}.
Additionaly, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as Costi(〈σ〉x1 ) < +∞, Player i visits also his
target set but not Tℓ. Thus, he reaches {0x | ¬x ∈ Ci} ∪ {1x | x ∈ Ci} and
this means that the clause Ci is true if each variable in Ci is replaced by its
valuation. As it is the case for each clause, the formula ψ is true.
x1
0x1
1x1
x2
0x2
1x2
. . . xm
0xm
1xm
P1 P2 . . . Pn Tw
Tℓ
Fig. 4. Reduction from the formula ψ to the quantitative reachability game Gψ
We conclude results about the threshold existence problem in quantitative
reachability games with some remarks about a variant of this problem in this
setting.
Remark 3. We may also consider this problem but with an upper and a lower
threshold. This problem is also NP-complete but the result about memory is a
little bit different. Indeed, the memory depends on the upper bound. If there
exists an NE which satisfies the constraints then there exists an other one which
satisfies the constraints too but with memory in O(maxi∈Π|yi 6=+∞ yi + |V | +
|Π |). The difference is due to the fact that we cannot apply iteratively the
procedure (P1) and then procedure (P2) to obtain a lasso as procedure (P1) can
decrease the cost of the outcome. So the new outcome could no longer satisfy
the constraints. To solve this problem, we only have to apply procedure (P2) on
the outcome of σ and obtain a lasso of length at most maxi∈Π|yi 6=+∞ yi + |V |.
Theorem 7. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and (X , x0) be its
extended game,
– For SPE, ([6]) Problem 1 is PSPACE-complete.
– If the answer of the decision problem is positive, there exists a strategy profile
σ with memory in O(2|Π| · |Π | · |V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1) which satisfies the
constraints and such that Costi(〈σ〉x0 ) ≤ |V | · |Π | if i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉x0 ).
Notice that, in [6], Problem 1 for SPE in quantitative reachability games is
shown PSPACE-complete with a lower and an upper threshold.
Proof. Let us prove the second assertion. It is a direct consequence of Corollary 1.
⊓⊔
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D.2 Proof of Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 for Problem 2
Lemma 5. Let (G, v0) be a reachability game (resp.(X , x0) its extended game)
and let w0 = v0 (resp. w0 = x0) Let k ∈ {0, . . . , |Π |} and c ∈ N be two thresholds,
let p ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π| be a cost profile and let σ be a strategy profile in (G, v0)
(resp. (X , x0)). We define R = {i ∈ Π | pi < +∞}. If (|R|,
∑
i∈R pi)  (k, c)
and (Costi(〈σ〉w0 ))i∈Π ≤ p then SW(〈σ〉w0 )  (k, c).
Proof. Assume that (|R|,
∑
i∈R pi)  (k, c) and (Costi(〈σ〉w0 ))i∈Π ≤ p. As
(Costi(〈σ〉w0 ))i∈Π ≤ p, we have that |Visit(〈σ〉w0 )| ≥ |R|.
Thus, SW(〈σ〉w0 )  (|R|,
∑
i∈R pi) and as the lexicographic ordering is tran-
sitive we have: SW(〈σ〉v0 )  (k, c). ⊓⊔
Proposition 5. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game.
– For NE, Problem 2 is NP-complete.
– If the answer to this decision problem is affirmative, then there exists a strat-
egy profile σ with memory in O((|Π |+1) · |V |) which satisfies the constraints
and such
∑
i∈Visit(〈σ〉v0 )
Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ |Π |
2 · |V | .
Proof. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and let k ∈ {0, . . . , |Π |}
and c ∈ N be two thresholds.
The NP-algorithm works as follows:
Step 1: Guess p ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π| a cost profile;
Step 2: Let R = {i ∈ Π | pi < +∞} be the set of players who have a finite cost
in the cost profile p, verify if (|R|,
∑
i∈R pi)  (k, c);
Step 3: Verify that there exists an NE σ in (G, v0) such that (Costi(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≤
p.(⋆)
Thanks to Proposition 3 and Lemma 5, this algorithm is an NP-algorithm
to solve Problem 2 for Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if there exists an NE which
fulfills constraints (⋆) there exists one with a polynomial memory and with costs
less or equal to |Π | · |V | for players who have visited their target set (see Corol-
lary 1). This leads to an NE such that the accumulated cost of the players who
have visited their target set is less or equal to |Π |2 · |V | and it also fulfills the
constraints for the social welfare.
The NP-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the SAT problem in
the same philosophy than the one for Problem 1 for NE in quantitative reacha-
bility games: the SAT-formula is satisfiable if and only if the exists an NE with
a social welfare  (|Π |, S) where S = 2mn+2m+ n (sum of the components of
the threshold fixed for the reduction for Problem 1). ⊓⊔
Theorem 8. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and (X , x0) be its
extended game.
– For SPE, Problem 2 is PSPACE-complete.
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– If the answer to this decision problem is positive, then there exists a strategy
profile σ with memory in O(2|Π| · |Π | · |V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1) which satisfies
the constraints and such
∑
i∈Visit(〈σ〉x0 )
Costi(〈σ〉x0) ≤ |Π |
2 · |V | .
Proof. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and (X , x0) be its ex-
tended game and let k ∈ {0, . . . , |Π |} and c ∈ N be two thresholds.
The PSPACE-algorithm works as follows:
Step 1: Guess p ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π| a cost profile;
Step 2:Let R = {i ∈ Π | pi < +∞} be the set of players who have a finite cost
in the cost profile p, verify if (|R|,
∑
i∈R pi)  (k, c);
Step 3:Verify that there exists an SPE σ in (X , x0) such that (Costi(〈σ〉x0))i∈Π ≤
p. (⋆)
Thanks to Theorem 7 and Lemma 5, this algorithm is a PSPACE-algorithm
to solve Problem 2 for SPE. Moreover, if there exists an SPE which fulfills the
constraints (⋆) there exists one with a finite-memory and with costs less or equal
to |Π | · |V | for players who have visited their target set (see Corollary 1). This
leads to an SPE such that the cost sum of the players who have visited their
target set is less or equal to |Π |2 · |V | and it fulfills the constraints (⋆) and thus
the constraints of Problem 2 (by Lemma 5).
The PSPACE-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the QBF prob-
lem (which is PSPACE-complete) in the same philosophy than the one for Prob-
lem 1 for SPE in quantitative reachability games (see [6]): the fully quantified
Boolean formula is satisfiable if and only if the exists an SPE with a social wel-
fare  (|Π | − 1, S) where S = 2mn + 2m + n (sum of the components of the
threshold fixed for the reduction for Problem 1 for SPE in quantitative reachabil-
ity games). But, if we want that the implication “⇐” holds, we have to slightly
change the arena of the game (see Figure 5): we add a vertex ⊥ that we add
in the target set of the “existential player” (Player n+ 1) and that is reachable
from q1 ∈ Vn+1 (we can assume that the formula ψ = Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qmxmφ(X)
is such that Qk = ∃ if k is odd and Qk = ∀ otherwise). Notice that the weight
2S on the edge (q1,⊥) should be understood as a path of length 2S.
The main idea of the implication “⇐” is the following one: we have an SPE
σ sucht that SW(〈σ〉q1 )  (|Π |−1, S). As Player n+1 visits his target set if and
only if Player n+2 does not, we have that |Visit(〈σ〉q1 )| = |Π |−1. Assume that
Player n+1 does not visit his target set, as the game is initialized in q1 which is
a vertex of Player n+ 1, he can go to ⊥ and in this way he visits his target set.
So, it is a profitable deviation for Player n + 1 and it leads to a contradiction
with the fact that σ is an SPE. We can conclude that σ is an SPE such that all
players excepted Player n+ 2 visit their target set.
Additionaly, for each ρ ∈ Plays(q1), if Costn+1(ρ) < +∞ (either the vertex
⊥ or the vertex tn+1 is reached) then no vertex tk with 1 ≤ k ≤ n is reached.
Then the philosophy of the proof is the same as the one in [6].
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Notice that the weight on the edge (q1,⊥) allows to ensure that, for implica-
tion “⇒”, Player n+ 1 does not have an incentive to go to ⊥ in place to follow
the valuation that makes the formula true.
q1
⊥
q2 q3 . . . qm c1 . . . cn tn+1
x1
¬x1
x2
¬x2
xm
¬xm
t1 tn
2S
Fig. 5. Reduction from the formula ψ to the quantitative reachability game Gψ for
Problem 2 with SPEs.
⊓⊔
D.3 Proof of Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 for Problem 3
Lemma 6. Problem 4 belongs to co-NP for quantitative reachability games.
Proof. Let us prove it for quantitative reachability games. If ρ is not Pareto
optimal, there exists a play ρ′ such that (Costi(ρ))i∈Π ≥ (Costi(ρ′))i∈Π and
(Costi(ρ))i∈Π 6= (Costi(ρ′))i∈Π . Moreover, thanks to Lemma 3, one may assume
that ρ′ is a lasso with size at most (|Π |+1) · |V |. So, we only have to guess such a
lasso ρ′ and to verify that (Costi(ρ))i∈Π ≥ (Costi(ρ′))i∈Π and (Costi(ρ))i∈Π 6=
(Costi(ρ
′))i∈Π . This can be done in polynomial time.
Proposition 6. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game, for NE:
– Problem 3 belongs to ΣP2 and is NP-hard.
– If the answer to this decision problem is positive, then there exists an NE
σ with memory in O((|Π | + 1) · |V |) such that for all i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉v0 ),
Costi(〈σ〉v0 ) ≤ |Π | · |V |.
Proof. We can provide the following ΣP2 -algorithm for Problem 3, given an or-
acle for Problem 4:
Step 1: Guess a play ρ as a lasso of length at most (|Π | + 1) · |V | (sufficient
thanks to Proposition 1).
Step 2: Check that (Costi(ρ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0) using the oracle
for Problem 4.
Step 3: Check that ρ is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium using the character-
ization.
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Additionally, as ρ is a lasso with length at most (|Π |+1) · |V |, it provides an
NE with outcome ρ and memory in O((|Π |+1)·|V |) such that for all i ∈ Visit(ρ),
Costi(ρ) ≤ |V | · |Π | (by Proposition 1).
The NP-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the SAT problem
which is NP-complete. The philosophy of the proof is the same than the one
for the qualitative setting (see proof of Proposition 10) but we have to put a
sufficiently high weight on the edge between the initial vertex and the vertex ⊥
to ensure that Player n+ 1 does not have an incentive to go to ⊥. ⊓⊔
Proposition 7. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game and let (X , x0)
its extended game, for SPE:
– Problem 3 is PSPACE-complete.
– If the answer to this decision problem is positive, then there exists an SPE
σ with memory with memory in O(2|Π| · |Π | · |V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1) which
satisfies the constraints such that for all i ∈ Visit(〈σ〉x0 ), Costi(〈σ〉x0 ) ≤
|Π | · |V |.
Proof. The PSPACE-algorithm works as follows
Step 1: Guess a cost profile p ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})|Π|;
Step 2: Check that p is Pareto optimal in Plays(x0) using the oracle for Prob-
lem 4.
Step 3: Verify that there exists an SPE τ such that p ≤ (Costi(〈τ〉x0 ))i∈Π ≤ p
(Problem 1)
We obtain an SPE τ such that (Costi(〈τ〉x0 ))i∈Π = p is Pareto optimal. By
Proposition 1, we have that for all i ∈ Visit(〈τ〉x0), Costi(〈τ〉x0 ) ≤ |V | · |Π |.
Thus, by Proposition 2, there exists an SPE σ with the same cost profile than τ
but with memory in O(2|Π| · |Π | · |V |(|Π|+1)·(|Π|+|V |)+1).
The PSPACE-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the QBF prob-
lem which is PSPACE-complete. The philosophy of the proof is the same than
the one for the qualitative setting (see proof of Proposition 13) but we have to
put a sufficiently high weight on the edge between the initial vertex and the
vertex ⊥. ⊓⊔
E Qualitative reachability games
E.1 Additional preliminaries
Qualitative reachability games All along this section we focus on qualitative
reachability games. Unlike quantitative reachability games, the arena is equipped
with a gain function profile (Gaini)i∈Π such that for all i ∈ Π , Gaini : Plays→
N ∪ {+∞} is a gain function which assigns a gain to each play ρ for Player i.
We also say that the play ρ has gain profile (Gaini(ρ))i∈Π and similarly if we
consider the outcome of the strategy profile σ from v0, we say that σ has gain
profile (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π .
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Definition 11. A qualitative reachability game G = (A, (Gaini)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π)
is a game enhanced with a target set Fi ⊆ V . For all i ∈ Π, the gain function
fi = Gaini is defined as follows: for all ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Plays: Gaini(ρ) = 1 if
there exists k ∈ N such that ρk ∈ Fi and Gaini(ρ) = 0 otherwise.
In this particular setting, players only aim to reach their target set but do
not take into account the number of steps it takes. Player i receives a gain of 1
if ρ visits his target set Fi, and a gain of 0 otherwise. Thus each player i wants
to maximize his gain.
Solution concepts For qualitative reachability games, it is easy to recover the
definitions of NE and SPE defined in Section 2 by reversing the inequality and
replacing cost functions by gain functions, as players want to maximize their
gain instead of minimizing their cost. This leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 7. Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative reachability game and σ be
a strategy profile. Consider the related qualitative reachability game G′ with the
same arena A and target sets (Fi)i∈Π , but the gain functions (Gaini)i∈Π . Then
if σ is an NE (resp. SPE) in (G, v0), then σ is also an NE (resp. SPE) in (G′, v0).
Thus, as it is proved that there always exists an SPE (and thus an NE)
in a quantitative reachability game, there always exists one in a qualitative
reachability game.
Theorem 9. In every initialized qualitative reachability game, there always ex-
ists an SPE, and thus also an NE.
Studied problems In case of qualitative reachability, as for quantitative reach-
ability game we are interested in a solution that fulfills certain requirements. For
example, we would like to know whether there exists a solution such that a max-
imum number of players visit their target sets.
Let (G, v0) be an initialized qualitative reachability game with G =
(A, (Gaini)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π). Given ρ ∈ Plays(v0), we denote by Visit(ρ) the set of
players i such that ρ visits Fi, that is, Visit(ρ) = {i ∈ Π | Gaini(ρ) = 1}. The
social welfare SW(ρ) of ρ is the size of Visit(ρ). Let P ⊆ {0, 1}|Π| be the set
of all gain profiles p = (Gaini(ρ))i∈Π , with ρ ∈ Plays(v0). A cost profile p ∈ P
is called Pareto-optimal in Plays(v0) if it is maximal in P with respect to the
componentwise ordering ≤ on P . Notice that if there exists ρ with Visit(ρ) = Π ,
then its social welfare is the largest possible and there exists a unique Pareto
optimal gain profile equal to (1, 1, . . . , 1). Notice also that certain target sets Fi
might be empty or not reachable from the initial vertex v0. Hence in this case,
the best that we can hope is a (unique) Pareto optimal gain profile p such that
pi = 1 if and only if Fi is reachable
9 from v0.
9 Notice that if Fi is reachable from v0, then it is necessarily not empty.
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Problem 5 (Threshold decision problem). Given an initialized qualitative reach-
ability game (G, v0), given two thresholds x, y ∈ {0, 1}|Π|, decide whether there
exists a solution σ such that x ≤ (Gaini(ρ))i∈Π ≤ y.
Imposing a lower bound xi = 1 means that player i has to visit his target set
whereas imposing an upper bound yi = 0 means that player i cannot visit his
target set.
Unlike quantitative reachability, social welfare in qualitative reachability games
only aims to maximize the number of players who visit their target set.
Problem 6 (Social welfare decision problem). Given an initialized qualitative
reachability game (G, v0), given a threshold k ∈ {0, . . . , |Π |}, decide whether
there exists a solution σ such that SW(〈σ〉v0 ) ≥ k.
Let us now state the last studied problem for qualitative reachability games.
Problem 7 (Pareto-optimal decision problem). Given an initialized qualitative
reachability game (G, v0) decide whether there exists a solution σ in (G, v0) such
that (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
This problem has some connections with the two previous ones. For instance
in case of qualitative reachability, suppose there exists a play in Plays(v0) that
visits all target sets. As already explained, there is only one Pareto-optimal gain
(1, . . . , 1). Asking for the existence of a solution σ such that (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π is
Pareto-optimal is equivalent to asking for the existence of a solution σ such that
Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≥ (1, . . . , 1) (see Problem 5), or such that SW(〈σ〉v0 ) ≥ |Π |
(see Problem 6).
E.2 Existence problem
The following Theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 7.
Theorem 10. Let (G, v0) be an initialized qualitative reachability game such
that its arena A is strongly connected. Then there exists an SPE σ (and thus
an NE) such that its outcome 〈σ〉v0 visits all target sets Fi, i ∈ Π, that are non
empty.
Let us comment this result. For this family of games, the answer to Prob-
lem 5 is always positive for particular thresholds. Take thresholds x, y such that
xi = 1 (and thus yi = 1) if and only if Fi 6= ∅. The answer to Problem 6 is also
always positive for threshold k = |{i | Fi 6= ∅}|. Finally, the answer to Problem 3
is also always positive since there exists an unique Pareto optimal gain profile p
such that pi = 1 if and only if Fi 6= ∅.
Recall that we explained before why it was enough to prove Theorem 1
for SPEs and for quantitative reachability games only. Notice that in case of
qualitative reachability games, there exists a simpler construction of the required
NE or SPE. Indeed, as the arena is strongly connected, there exists a play ρ ∈
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Plays(v0) that visits all non empty target sets. (i) Hence to get an NE, construct
a strategy profile σ in (G, v0) such that 〈σ〉v0 = ρ. As the gain profile of σ is the
best that each player can hope, no player has an incentive to deviate and σ is
then an NE. (ii) The construction is a little more complex to get an SPE. We
again construct a strategy profile σ in (G, v0) such that 〈σ〉v0 = ρ, and inductively
extend its construction to all subgames (G↾h, v) as follows. Assume that σ↾h is
not yet constructed, then extend the construction of σ such that σ↾h = gρ for
some gv0 starting in v and ending in v0 (such a history gv0 exists because the
arena is strongly connected). In this way, the outcome of σ↾h in each subgame
(G, v) has gain profile (1, . . . , 1) and no player has an incentive to deviate. It
follows that σ is an SPE.
The next theorem states that Problem 3 has a positive answer for all quali-
tative reachability games with a number of players limited to two, and that this
existence result cannot be extended to three players.
Theorem 11. Let (G, v0) be an initialized qualitative reachability game,
– Let (G, v0) be an initialized qualitative reachability game such that |Π | = 2,
there exists an SPE σ (and thus an NE) with a gain profile that is Pareto
optimal in Plays(v0).
– There exists an initialized qualitative reachability games with |Π | = 3 that
has no NE with a gain profile that is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
Let us focus on the proof of Theorem 11 which is based on the next lemma,
which is interesting in its own right.
Lemma 8. Let (G, v0) be an initialized qualitative reachability game. Let p be
a gain profile equal to (0, 0, . . . , 0) or (1, 1, . . . , 1). If p is Pareto-optimal10 in
Plays(v0), then there exists an SPE σ with gain profile p.
Proof. The case p = (0, 0, . . . , 0) is easy to solve. By Pareto-optimality, all plays
in Plays(v0) have gain profile p. Hence every strategy profile σ is trivially an SPE
with gain profile p. Let us turn to case p = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and let ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈
Plays(v0) with gain profile p. By Theorem 2.1 in [3]
11, there exists an SPE σ
in (G, v0). If (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π = p, we are done. Otherwise let us show how to
modify σ into another SPE τ with outcome ρ and thus with gain profile p. Let
h ∈ Histi(v0), i ∈ Π ,
– if h is a prefix of ρ, then τi(h) = ρ|h|+1,
– otherwise, τi(h) = σi(h).
Let us prove that τ is an SPE. Clearly for each history hv that is not a prefix
of ρ, τ↾h = σ↾h is an NE in the subgame (G↾h, v). So let hv = ρ0 . . . ρk. As 〈τ↾h〉v
has gain profile (1, 1, . . . , 1) in (G↾h, v), player i such that v ∈ Vi has no incentive
to deviate, and then τ↾h is also an NE in (G↾h, v). ⊓⊔
10 (1, 1, . . . , 1) is trivially Pareto-optimal.
11 Notice that we cannot apply Theorem 1 since the arena is not necessarily strongly
connected.
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Proof (of Theorem 11). We begin with the first item. There are three cases
to study: either the unique Pareto-optimal gain profile of Plays(v0) is equal to
(0, 0), or it is equal to (1, 1), or there are one or two Pareto-optimal gain profiles
that belong to {(0, 1), (1, 0)}. In the first two cases, we get the required SPE
by Lemma 8. Hence it remains to treat the last case. From Lemma 2, we know
that there exists an SPE in (G, v0) whose outcome ρ visits a least one target set
Fi, i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore the gain profile of ρ is either equal to (0, 1) or (1, 0) as
required.
v0v1 v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
(0, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 1)
(1, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1)
Fig. 6. A qualitative reachability game that has no NE with a gain profile that is
Pareto-optimal
For the second item, consider the initialized qualitative reachability game
(G, v0) of Figure 6. We have three players such that player 3 owns diamond
vertices. Moreover, F1 = {v4, v5}, F2 = {v3, v5}, and F3 = {v4, v6}. There are
four plays in Plays(v0) whose gain profile is indicated below each of them. The
set of Pareto-optimal gain profiles in Plays(v0) is equal to {(1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)}.
Consider a strategy profile σ with outcome v0v1v
ω
4 and gain profile (1, 0, 1).
Then it is not an NE because player 2 has a profitable deviation by going from
v1 to v3 (instead of v4). Similarly the strategy profile σ with outcome v0v2v
ω
5
and gain profile (1, 1, 0) is not an NE. Therefore there is no NE in (G, v0) with
a gain profile that is Pareto-optimal.
⊓⊔
E.3 Decision problems
λ-consistent play The notion of λ-consistent play explained in Section 4.1 can
easily be adapted for qualitative reachability games. In the qualitative setting,
λ(v) allows us to know if the player who owns v can ensure to reach his target
set from v or not.
Lassoes with polynomial size
Lemma 9. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game and ρ ∈ Plays be a
play.
– If ρ′ is the play obtained by applying (P1) or (P2) on ρ, then for all i ∈ Π,
Gaini(ρ
′) = Gaini(ρ).
– Applying (P1) until it is no longer possible and then (P2), leads to a lasso
ρ′ with size at most (|Π |+ 1) · |V |.
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And the property on λ-consistence after applying (P1) or (P2) also holds.
Lemma 10. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game and ρ ∈ Plays be a
λ-consistent play for a given labeling function λ. If ρ′ is the play obtained by
applying (P1) or (P2) on ρ, then ρ′ is λ-consistent.
Results on Nash equilibria
Characterization of outcomes of NEs The characterization provides in Sec-
tion 4.2 for NEs remains true for qualitative reachability games with some modi-
fications: using the notion of qualitative coalitional game in place of quantitative
coalitional game, replacing Cost by Gain in the characterization, reversing the
inequalities, . . .
Notions of coalitional game, value and optimal strategies can be rewritten if
G is a qualitative reachability game and we obtain |Π | (qualitative) coalitional
games. Qualitative coalitional games are also determined, there exist positional
optimal strategies for both players and the values can be computed in polynomial
time [17].
Complexity and memory results
Theorem 12. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game, for NE: Problem 5
and Problem 6 are NP-complete while Problem 7 is NP-hard and belongs to ΣP2 .
Theorem 13. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game, for NE: for each
decision problem, if its answer is positive, then there exists a strategy profile σ
with memory in O((|Π |+ 1) · |V |) which satisfies the conditions.
These two theorems are due to Propositions 8,9 and 10
Proposition 8 ([10]). Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game, for NE:
– Problem 5 is NP-complete.
– If the answer to this decision problem is positive, then there exists a strategy
profile with memory in O((|Π | + 1) · |V |) which satisfies the constraints.
Proposition 9. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game.
– For NE, Problem 6 is NP-complete.
– If the answer to this decision problem is positive, then there exists a strategy
profile with memory in O((|Π | + 1) · |V |) which satisfies the constraints.
Proof. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game and let k ∈ {0, . . . , |Π |} be
a threshold.
The NP-algorithm works as follows:
Step 1: Guess p ∈ {0, 1}|Π| a gain profile (sufficient thanks to Lemma 9);
Step 2: Let R = {i ∈ Π | pi = 1} be the set of players who have a gain equal
to 1 in the gain profile p, verify if |R| ≥ k;
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Step 3:Verify that there exists an NE σ in (G, v0) such that (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≥
p.
As if (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≥ p then |Visit(〈σ〉v0 )| ≥ |R| ≥ k, and thanks to
Proposition 8, this algorithm is an NP-algorithm to solve Problem 6 for Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, if there exists an NE which fulfills the constraints there
exists one with a polynomial memory which fulfills the constraints too.
The NP-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the SAT problem
in the same philosophy than the one for Problem 1 (see Proposition 4) for NE
in quantitative reachability games: the SAT-formula is satisfiable if and only if
there exists an NE with a social welfare ≥ |Π |. ⊓⊔
Proposition 10. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game, for NE:
– Problem 7 belongs to ΣP2 and is NP-hard.
– If the answer of this decision problem is positive, then there exists a strategy
profile with memory in O((|Π | + 1) · |V |) which satisfies the constraints.
The proof of Proposition 10 relies on the complexity of the variant of Prob-
lem 4 for qualitative reachability games.
Problem 8. Given a qualitative reachability game (G, v0) and a lasso ρ ∈ Plays,
we want to decide if (Gaini(ρ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0).
This decision problem belongs to co-NP.
Lemma 11. Problem 8 belongs to co-NP for qualitative reachability games.
Proof. The same proof as for quantitative reachability games holds by using
Gain in place of Cost and reversing the inequalities. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 10). We can provide the following ΣP2 -algorithm for Prob-
lem 3, given an oracle for Problem 8:
Step 1: Guess a play ρ as a lasso of size (|Π | + 1) · |V | (sufficient thanks to
Lemma 9);
Step 2: Check that (Gaini(ρ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0) using the or-
acle for Problem 8.
Step 3: Check that ρ is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium using the character-
ization.
The NP-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the SAT problem
that is NP-complete. Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be the set of variables and ψ =
C1 ∧ . . .∧Cn is a Boolean formula in CNF over X and equals to the conjunction
of the clauses C1, . . . , Cn. This problem is to decide if the formula ψ is true.
Such a formula is true if there exists a valuation I : X → {0, 1} such that the
valuation of X with respect to I evaluates ψ to true.
We build the following qualitative reachability game Gψ = (A, (Gaini)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π)
where A = (Π,V,E, (Vi)i∈Π):
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– the arenaA is depicted in Figure 7 where the set of playersΠ = {1, . . . , n, n+
1} has n + 1 players: one by clause (players 1 to n) and an additional one.
Vn+1 is depicted by squared vertices and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Vi = {Pi};
– Fn+1 = {Tw,⊥};
– for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Fi = {0x | ¬x ∈ Ci} ∪ {1x | x ∈ Ci} ∪ {Tℓ}.
The game Gψ can be build from ψ in polynomial time. Let us show that ψ
is true if and only if there exists an NE σ in (Gψ, x1) such that Gain(〈σ〉x1 ) is
Pareto optimal in Plays(x1).
(⇒) Suppose that ψ is true. Then there exists I : X → {0, 1} such that the
valuation of ψ with respect to I evaluates ψ to true.
Let us consider σ defined in this way:
– for all hv ∈ Histn+1(x1), σn+1(hv) =


I(v) if v = x with x ∈ X
xk+1 if v = 0xk or 1xkwith 0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1
P1 if v = 0xm or 1xm
Tℓ if v = Tℓ
Tw if v = Tw
⊥ if v =⊥
.
– for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 (resp. for i = n), for all hv ∈ Histi(x1) σi(hv) = Pi+1
(resp. Tw) if hv is consistent with σn+1 and σi(hv) = Tℓ otherwise.
We now prove that σ is an NE. It is clear that 〈σ〉x1 is of the forme hP1P2 . . . PnT
ω
w
and as σn+1 corresponds to the valuation I which evaluates ψ to true, we have
that for all i ∈ Π , Gaini(〈σ〉x1 ) = 1. Obviously no player has a profitable devi-
ation and (Gaini(〈σ〉x1 ))i∈Π .
(⇐) We will prove its contrapositive. Assume that ψ is not true. As ψ is not
true, there exists a player i ∈ Π such that if he wants to win (obtain a gain
of 1) he has to go to Tℓ. However, in this way Player n + 1 does not reach his
target set and his only possibility to do so is to go to ⊥. It means that the only
possible outcome for an NE is x1 ⊥ω with gain profile (0, . . . , 0, 1) which is not
Pareto optimal in Plays(x1). Indeed, as at least one clause can be evaluated to
true, assume it is clause Ci (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n), there exists a play in Plays(x1)
such that Player i visits his target set and which ends in Tw.
⊓⊔
Results on subgame perfect equilibria
Complexity and memory results
Theorem 14. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game, for SPE: Prob-
lem 5, Problem 6 and Problem 7 are PSPACE-complete.
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x1
0x1
1x1
⊥
x2
0x2
1x2
. . . xm
0xm
1xm
P1 P2 . . . Pn Tw
Tℓ
Fig. 7. Reduction from the formula ψ to the quantitative reachability game Gψ
Theorem 15. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game, for SPE: for each
decision problem, if the answer is positive, there exists a strategy profile σ with
memory in O(|V |3 · |Π | · 23·|Π|) which satisfies the conditions.
These two theorems are due to Propositions 11,12 and 13.
Proposition 11 ([4]). Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game.
– For SPE, Problem 5 is PSPACE-complete.
– If the answer of the decision problem is positive, there exists a strategy profile
with memory in O(|V |3 · |Π | · 23·|Π|) which satisfies the constraints.
Proposition 12. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game.
– For SPE, Problem 6 is PSPACE-complete.
– If the answer of the decision problem is positive, there exists a strategy profile
with memory in O(|V |3 · |Π | · 23·|Π|) which satisfies the constraints.
Proof. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game and let k ∈ {0, . . . , |Π |} be
a threshold.
The PSPACE-algorithm works as follows:
Step 1: Guess p ∈ {0, 1}|Π| a gain profile;
Step 2: Let R = {i ∈ Π | pi = 1} be the set of players who have a cost equal
to 1 in the cost profile p, verify if |R| ≥ k;
Step 3:Verify that there exists an SPE σ in (G, v0) such that (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≥
p.
As if (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≥ p then |Visit(〈σ〉v0 )| ≥ |R| ≥ k, and thanks to
Proposition 11, this algorithm is a PSPACE-algorithm to solve Problem 6 for
SPE. Moreover, if there exists an SPE which fulfills the constraints there exists
one with a finite memory which fulfills the constraints too.
The PSPACE-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the QBF prob-
lem (which is PSPACE-complete) in the same philosophy than the one for Prob-
lem 2 for SPE in quantitative reachability games: the fully quantified formula
is satisfiable if and only if the exists an SPE with a social welfare ≥ |Π | − 1.
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Notice that in the qualitative setting, there is no weight on the edge (q1,⊥) in
the arena depicted in Figure 5. ⊓⊔
Proposition 13. Let (G, v0) be a qualitative reachability game,
– For SPE, Problem 7 is PSPACE-complete.
– If the answer of the decision problem is positive, there exists a strategy profile
with memory in O(|V |3 · |Π | · 23·|Π|) which satisfies the constraints.
Proof. We can provide the following PSPACE-algorithm for Problem 7, given
an oracle for Problem 8:
Step 1: Guess a payoff p ∈ {0, 1}|Π|.
Step 2: Check that p is Pareto optimal in Plays(v0) using the oracle for Prob-
lem 8.
Step 3: Check if there exists an SPE σ, such that p ≤ (Gaini(〈σ〉v0 ))i∈Π ≤ p.
By Lemma 11 and Proposition 11, Step 2 is done in co-NP and Step 3 is
done in PSPACE. It leads to a PSPACE-algorithm.
The PSPACE-hardness is due to a polynomial reduction from the QBF prob-
lem (which is PSPACE-complete) in the same philosophy than the one for Prob-
lem 2 for SPE in quantitative reachability games: the fully quantified formula is
satisfiable if and only if the exists an SPE with a gain profile which is Pareto
optimal. Notice that in the qualitative setting, there is no weight on the edge
(q1,⊥) in the arena depicted in Figure 5.
For the implication “⇐”, we assume that we have an SPE σ such that
(Gaini(〈σ〉q1 ))i∈Π is Pareto optimal in Plays(q1) and we want to prove that
the fully quantified formula ψ is satisfied. In the game Gψ , there is only two
Pareto optimal gain profile: (g1, . . . , gn, 1, 0) and (g1, . . . , gn, 0, 1) where gi = 1
if the clause Ci is satisfiable in ψ and gi = 0 otherwise. One can prove that the
gain profile (g1, . . . , gn, 0, 1) cannot be the gain profile of an SPE as in this gain
profile Player n+1 has a gain of 0 and Player n+1 can chose to go in ⊥ to ensure
a gain of 1. Thus, we know that σ is an SPE with gain profile (g1, . . . , gn, 1, 0)
and in particular such that Player n + 1 visits his target set. Then, the same
kind of arguments used in the proof of Problem 1 (see [6]) can be used. ⊓⊔
